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“Not only so, but we also rejoice in our sufferings, because we know that suffering produces 
perseverance; perseverance, character; and character, hope. And hope does not disappoint us, 
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This paper studies the relation between the transparency of a firm’s public information 
environment and the insider trading profitability of its outside directors. I compare the same 
outside director’s trading returns at different firms with different levels of public information 
transparency, and find that the same director makes higher purchase returns at firms with more 
transparent public information. Additional tests indicate that these findings are unlikely to be a 
result of variations in outside directors’ private information sets, or these directors’ litigation 
risks. Transparent public information thus appears to assist outside directors in forming their 





How does the transparency of a firm’s public information environment affect the insider 
trading profitability of its outside directors? At first glance, it seems that transparent public 
information improves the information sets of investors and therefore should reduce outside 
directors’ trading profitability, as it does to the trading profitability of managers and inside 
directors (hereafter “pure insiders”) found by prior literature (Frankel and Li, 2004).1
                                                     
1 I follow Bushman et al. (2004) and define the transparency (opacity) of a firm’s information environment as the 
“availability (unavailability) of firm-specific information to those outside publicly traded firms.” See also Maffett 
(2012). Accordingly, “public information” refers to information that is available to parties outside the firm and 
“private information” (or “internal information”) refers to information that can only be acquired via channels 
unavailable to those outside the firm. Note that the term “private information” has been used differently in prior 
literature: it refers to information possessed by an insider or informed trader that is superior to that possessed by 
uninformed traders. Although the informed trader’s overall information signal is not observable by uninformed 
traders (and therefore “private”), public information could contribute to the forming of that information signal (Kim 
and Verrecchia, 1994, 1997). In other words, the source of the informed trader’s signal does not have to be 
nonpublic. In this paper, I use terms such as “outside director’s information sets” or “outside director’s superior 
information” to refer to the overall information signal possessed by the outside director that is not observable to 
investors (i.e. “private information” that is used by prior literature). See Chapter 2 for more discussion.  
 However, 
this conjecture relies on the implicit assumption that outside directors’ informational advantage 
comes solely from their access to nonpublic information. Yet the validity of this assumption has 
not been tested: despite the robust evidence on the existence of corporate insiders’ (including 
outside directors’) informational advantage (e.g., Seyhun,1986, 1992; Ravina and Sapienza, 
2010), the source of such advantage remains largely unexplored. In this paper, I take up this task 
and investigate whether transparent public information can assist outside directors in forming 




Transparent public information could improve the information sets of outside directors 
and increase their informational advantage in two ways. First, it can serve as a foundation for 
outside directors to gather and/or process more private information. Public information such as 
analyst reports provide a broad and comprehensive summary about a firm’s operation, 
performance and valuation (Asquith et al. 2005). Lacking direct involvement in their firms’ daily 
operation, outside directors often need such information as a starting point to further acquire 
and/or process more detailed and/or specific private information. This is very different from pure 
insiders: the latter’s deep involvement in managing and operating the firm enables them to gain 
extensive firm-specific knowledge and therefore, they are less likely to refer to public 
information. Second, outside directors’ opportunities to acquire information from nonpublic 
channels could enable them to better interpret public information than pure outsiders do (Kim 
and Verrecchia, 1994). This is because their private knowledge about their firms provides them 
with a context or background to the information that is publicly available. In other words, public 
information combined with the outside directors’ private knowledge generates new information 
sets that are superior to the information sets of pure outsiders.2
                                                     
2 Private knowledge about the firm also allows pure insiders to better process public information than investors do. 
However, this complementary effect between public and private information may not translate into higher trading 
profitability for pure insiders for two reasons. First, pure insiders have a higher chance to acquire private 
information that could be superior to the information signals generated from processing public information 
(Verrecchia, 1982; Diamond, 1985; Kim and Verrecchia, 1997). Therefore, the transparency of a firm’s public 
information environment is less likely to have an impact on the information set of a pure insider than on that of an 
outside director. Second, even when pure insiders generate informational advantage by acquiring private information 
and processing public information, the effect of public information transparency on the trading profitability for these 
two channels are confounding: ceteris paribus, it decreases trading profitability for the former channel and increases 
trading profitability for the latter. Thus, the more private information an insider acquires, the more likely that the 
former effect dominates and public information transparency reduces trading profitability. 
 In short, the unique position of 
outside directors makes it possible for information from public and private channels to 
complement each other; an informational advantage of outside directors can thus arise in a 
transparent public information environment.   
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Although transparent public information is more likely to improve the information sets of 
outside directors’ than to improve those of pure insiders’, it is also possible that the public 
information environment of a firm is irrelevant to the quality of information that outside directors 
possess. This is likely to occur when information from private channels subsumes or supplants 
public information (Verrecchia, 1982; Diamond, 1985). In other words, outside directors could 
be just like pure insiders: they may not need public information as a base for further information 
acquisition, and/or they may not process public information because information acquired from 
internal sources is superior.3
One concern needs to be addressed when testing the relation between public information 
transparency and outside director trading profitability: unobservable characteristics of outside 
directors could be correlated with the information environment and their trading behavior. For 
example, outside directors who invest much time and/or energy in information acquisition may 
be drawn to firms with high quality public information (Beasley et al., 2010)
 Thus, public information transparency may have no effect on the 
quality of outside directors’ information sets. At the same time, the information sets of pure 
outsiders are improved by transparent public information (Healy and Palepu, 2001; Hong et al., 
2000); thus, under this scenario, the overall informational advantage (and therefore the trading 
profitability) of outside directors would decrease with public information transparency. 
4
                                                     
3 The superiority of internal information could be due to either higher precision or lower acquisition or processing 
costs (Verrecchia, 1982; Diamond, 1985).  
. These outside 
directors are also more likely to make higher insider trading profits due to their engagement in 
information acquisition and processing, even though the information they acquire and trade on 
could come solely from internal channels. Thus, an association between the transparency of 
public information and the trading returns of outside directors may simply be driven by outside 
4 Survey results by Beasley et al. (2010) show that it is common practice for outside directors to examine a firm’s 
public information (e.g., SEC filings, corporate websites, analyst reports) before deciding to join the firm. 
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directors’ (unobservable) habit in information acquisition and trading (Hillier, Korczak and 
Korczak, 2013).  
To overcome this problem, I exploit the feature that many outside directors sit on 
multiple boards. Specifically, I study a sample of 599 outside directors at 921 U.S. public firms 
from 2000 to 2010 and require that each outside director in the sample sits on at least two boards. 
In so doing, I can use an outside director as her own control and test the correlation between the 
differential trading profitability of the same outside director at two different firms and the 
differential level of public information transparency between those two firms.  
I use two important components of a firm’s public information environment to capture its 
overall transparency: financial statements and analyst information. In particular, I use the ability 
of financial statement items in predicting future cash flows (Barth et al., 2001) to measure 
financial statement transparency, and I measure analyst information quality using analyst 
following, forecast dispersion and forecast errors.5
I separately examine the profitability of open market purchases and sales because 
litigation concerns and liquidity needs may render the information content of sales to be different 




                                                     
5 See Chapter 3 and Appendix for more details of the measures. The results are robust to using alternative measures 
of financial statement transparency and analyst information quality. See Chapter 7 for details. 
 I find that the differences in the open market purchase returns made by the same director 
between the two firms in each firm pair is positively associated with the differences in public 
information transparency between the two firms. In other words, the same outside director makes 
higher returns from her purchases at firms with more transparent public information. On average, 
6 Specifically, litigation risk is higher for insider sales than for insider purchases (Noe, 1999; Cheng and Lo, 2006); 
therefore, the likelihood that an outside director may possess superior information but refrain from trading on it is 
higher for sales than for purchases. Also, insider sales are more likely to be driven by liquidity needs compared to 
insider purchases. See Chapter 6 for more details.  
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one standard deviation increase in the difference in public information transparency is associated 
with 2.8 to 3.1 percentage-point higher returns made by the outside director at the more 
transparent firm.7
One alternative explanation of the above findings is that transparency of a firm’s public 
information environment is correlated with the quality of its outside directors’ information from 
private channels (Dichev et al., 2012). I conduct two additional sets of tests to address this issue. 
First, I study the cases when outside directors have more chances to access information from 
internal sources. If public information transparency merely captures internal information quality, 
its effect should be more pronounced when outside directors’ chances to access internal 
information increases. I proxy for outside directors’ access to private information using the 
importance of the outside director’s position on the board measured by the number of committee 
positions held (Duellman et al., 2011),
 The evidence is consistent with outside directors having a larger informational 
advantage over equity investors in a more transparent public information environment.  
8
Second, I examine the effect of one of my public information measures, namely analyst 
information quality, on outside director trading profitability for firms that are highly affected by 
the macro-economy. Prior research suggests that analysts’ expert inputs in their macro-economic 
 and the social connections between the outside director 
and the CEO (Cao et al., 2011). I find that the effect of public information is mitigated by these 
factors, suggesting that public information is more important for outside directors who have 
limited access to private information. 
                                                     
7 This accounts for about 10% of the average absolute difference in returns made by the same outside director across 
two firms. See Chapter 5 for details.  
8 The amount of private information available to members across different board committees may vary; however, 
besides the chance of accessing private information through the committee position, the number of total committees 
an outside director serves may also signal her overall importance as a board member, and the more important an 
outside director is, the higher the chance that she will have access to more private information. Additional tests show 
that the results are also robust to including only audit committee and compensation committee positions. See 
Chapter 6 for details. 
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analyses are more valuable for firms that are highly exposed to macroeconomic conditions 
(Hutton et al., 2012). Thus, the association between analyst information quality and trading 
profitability should be more pronounced for these firms if what I document is the effect of 
analyst information rather than unobservable internal information. Consistent with my 
prediction, I find that the effect of the analyst information is stronger for outside directors at 
these firms.  
All the above results are specific to purchases. I find no such effects in outside director 
sales. In fact, for my sample, trading returns of outsider director sales are considerably lower 
than are trading returns of outside director purchases: the mean size-adjusted six-month and 
twelve-month sales (purchase) returns are 1% (7%) and 0% (13%), respectively.9
This paper extends the insider trading literature by documenting the source of 
informational advantage that outside directors have over investors. Prior studies in the insider 
trading literature provide robust evidence in the superior information possessed by corporate 
insiders (Seyhun, 1986, 1992; Ravina and Sapienza, 2010), yet how the superior information is 
formed is not explicitly examined, but is generally assumed to come from sources unavailable to 
parties outside the firm. The findings of this paper suggest that for outside directors, public 
 This finding is 
consistent with the insider trading literature which finds that trading returns are driven largely by 
purchases (Lakonishok and Lee 2001). In addition, I find that the association between public 
information transparency and outside director sales returns is sensitive to litigation risk, whereas 
the association between public information transparency and purchase returns is not. These 
findings suggest that purchases are a better proxy for information-driven trades than sales. 
                                                     
9 The trading returns are computed as the buy-and-hold returns starting from the date which an outside director 




information can facilitate information acquisition and processing and their informational 
advantage can arise in a transparent information environment. These results are in contrast to 
prior literature’s finding that public information transparency reduces the trading profitability of 
pure insiders (Frankel and Li, 2004). This paper thus highlights the heterogeneity among 
corporate insiders in the dominating source of their informational advantage. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Chapter 2 reviews prior literature 
and develops the hypothesis; Chapter 3 discusses the research design; Chapter 4 presents the 
sample selection process and the descriptive statistics; Chapters 5 through 7 discuss the empirical 




RELATED LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
Prior Literature 
This paper is related to a large literature on the profitability of insider trading. This 
literature provides robust evidence in the abnormal trading returns of corporate insiders (e.g., 
Seyhun, 1986, 1992; Lakonishok and Lee, 2001; Ke, Huddart and Petroni, 2003; Piotroski and 
Roulstone, 2004; Ravina and Sapienza, 2010). Specific to the trading profitability of outside 
directors, Ravina and Sapienza (2010) document that outside directors make abnormal returns, 
although the returns are lower than those made by pure insiders. Overall, the literature has taken 
it as a given that corporate insiders have informational advantage over equity investors; 
therefore, several studies use insider trading returns as a proxy for information asymmetry 
between insiders and investors. For example, Frankel and Li (2004) use the abnormal trading 
returns made by pure insiders to measure the information asymmetry between investors and 
insiders, and study the effectiveness of several types of public information in reducing this 
asymmetry. Outside directors, however, are excluded from their sample because their focus is on 
the information asymmetry between managers and investors. Other studies along this line 
include:  Aboody and Lev (2000), in which the authors take the positive association between 
insider trading returns and R&D activities as evidence that R&D increases information 
asymmetry; Aboody, Hughes and Liu (2005), in which the authors interpret the positive 
association between insider trading profitability of a firm and its exposure to the information risk 
factor as suggesting that information risk increases cost of capital through insider trading; and 
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Huddart and Ke (2007), in which the authors use insider trading returns to validate several 
proxies for information asymmetry and document mixed evidence across different proxies. 
A common attribute of these studies is that it is taken as a given that insiders have better 
information than investors do, yet the question of how the superior information is formed is not 
explicitly answered. Two recent studies on outside directors’ information sources provide some 
answer to this question, although the primary focus is on the sources that are not publicly 
available. Specifically, Cao et al. (2011) find that outside directors who have social connections 
with managers make higher abnormal trading returns than their peers. Their findings are 
consistent with social connections serving as a channel for private information transfer from 
managers to outside directors. Duellman et al. (2011) document that the abnormal trading returns 
of audit committee members are higher than their peers, suggesting that an audit committee 
position offers more opportunities to gather private information. This paper extends this line of 
research by examining the possibility that public information can also help outside directors form 
their superior information sets. Combined with prior literature’s finding that pure insiders make 
lower trading returns under a more transparent information environment (Frankel and Li, 2004), 
this paper sheds light on the heterogeneity among different groups of corporate insiders in the 
contributing factors of their informational advantages. 
Hypothesis Development 
Although I do not aim to test any particular analytical model, my analysis is motivated by 
two strands of theoretical literature. The first strand models the trading behavior of corporate 
insiders (Huddar et al., 2001; Huddart and Ke, 2007). In these models, the profitability of insider 
trading is driven by two components of an insider’s informational advantage: the investors’ prior 
uncertainty in the firm’s value and the precision of the insider’s information signal. The insider 
10 
 
reaps higher trading returns when the market is more uncertain about the firm’s value (i.e. lower 
precision of investors’ information ex ante) and/or when the insider possesses more precise 
information.10
A firm’s public information environment can affect both components. In particular, 
transparent public information improves the information sets of equity investors and thus reduces 
their uncertainty about the firm’s value, therefore reducing the insider’s informational advantage, 
ceteris paribus (Healy and Palepu, 2001; Row (1) of Figure 1). The effect of public information 
transparency on the precision of the insider’s information, however, is not straightforward, and a 
second strand of analytical literature can help shed light on this issue. Specifically, this literature 
analyzes the effect of public information on private information acquisition the information 
asymmetry between informed and uninformed traders. If the private information that can be 
acquired by the informed trader is a complement to the public information, then public 
information triggers private information acquisition and information asymmetry increases (Kim 
and Verrecchia, 1994, 1997). On the other hand, if the private information signal is an alternative 
or substitute to the public information signal, then public information crowds out private 
information gathering (Verrecchia, 1982; Diamond, 1985).  
 This strand of literature is agnostic on the determinants of each of these two 
components.  
For outside directors, either or both of the above two scenarios can happen due to their 
unique informational position in the firm (see Row (2) of Figure 1). Their position is between 
that of pure insiders and pure outsiders. On the one hand, they are unlike pure insiders who have 
                                                     
10 This literature uses the term “private information” to refer to the information signal possessed by the insider when 
making trading decisions. However, this information does not necessarily come from nonpublic channels (although 
often widely assumed so). As discussed below, an insider’s superior information could come from better processed 
public information. In this case, the insider’s overall information signal can be considered “private” in the sense that 
it is not available to outsiders (outsiders do not have access to private information which facilitates better 




first hand information from direct involvement in the operations of the firm; on the other hand, 
they are also different from pure outsiders who rely solely on publicly disclosed information. 
Pure insiders can privately transfer (at least part of) their information to outside directors. In 
addition, outside directors can acquire private information from channels other than 
management, such as internal and external auditors (Wong, 2011). 
Outside directors’ relatively remote position from their firm’s operation compared to pure 
insiders makes it possible that they rely on public information to form and improve their own 
information sets. First, they could use public information as a foundation to gather and/or process 
information from internal channels. This is because information from internal channels is often 
more specific and detailed than information provided to the public. Outside directors often face 
the problem of “information overload”—receiving information from management with too much 
detail and it is a challenge for them to synthesize such information (National Association of 
Corporate Directors, 2009). Information provided to parties outside the firm, however, often 
offers a broad and comprehensive summary of a firm’s performance and valuation. One example 
would be analyst reports that contain firm-specific information processed and synthesized by 
financial analysts using their expertise (Ramnath, Rock and Shane, 2008; Lehavy, Li and 
Merkley, 2011). Therefore, public information could facilitate outside directors in collecting and 
processing information from internal channels and contribute to better information sets possessed 
by outside directors.  
A second reason why a transparent information environment may help increase outside 
directors’ informational advantage is that outside directors’ private information could enable 
them to better interpret or process public information (Kim and Verrecchia, 1994). For example, 
faced with the same analyst report on the changes in the industry conditions that the firm 
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operates in, an outside director who has communicated with managers on the firm’s strategic 
plans has more insight in how the industry condition changes would impact the firm’s strategies 
than a pure outsider does. In other words, the outside director now has superior information over 
equity investors because of her ability to better process the analyst report, and such ability would 
be useless absent the report.  
In sum, transparent public information can contribute to the forming of superior 
information possessed by outside directors by assisting them in acquiring more private 
information, or giving them the opportunity to utilize their superior ability in processing public 
information. Under this scenario, the transparency of public information environment generates 
confounding effects on the two components of outside directors’ informational advantage 
(Column (1) of Figure 1): it reduces investors’ prior uncertainty about firm value (thus reduces 
outside directors’ informational advantage), and it increases the precision of outside directors’ 
information sets (thus increases their informational advantage). Hence, the overall impact of 
public information transparency on the trading profitability of outside directors depends on 
which one of these two effects dominates. 
Although outside directors are more likely to rely on public information when forming 
their own information sets than are pure insiders, it is also possible that information from private 
channels can subsume or supplant public information. With sufficient information sharing 
between pure insiders (or other parties such as internal auditors and consultants) and outside 
directors, outside directors’ understanding in their firms can be very close to that of pure 
insiders. Under this scenario, outside directors would be able to process the detailed internal 
information without having to refer to public information. Also, even though outside directors’ 
private knowledge about their firms still allows them to better process public information than 
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investors do, they may not choose to do so because private communication could give them 
better information, and/or information of the same quality at lower costs. In this case, public 
information environment is at best irrelevant to the precision or quality of outside directors’ 
information sets. At the same time, transparent public information improves the information sets 
of investors (Column (2) of Figure 1). Thus, public information transparency reduces outside 
directors’ informational advantage and therefore their trading profitability.11
The above analyses are summarized in Figure 1. In short, transparent public information 
environment may affect outside directors’ informational advantage and trading profitability in 
the following ways: 1) it reduces outside director’s informational advantage by improving 
investors’ information sets, and 2) it increases (or have no effect on) outside directors’ 
informational advantage by improving (or not affecting) their information sets. The following 
hypothesis (stated in the null form) thus arises: 
  
Hypothesis: The transparency of a firm’s public information environment is not associated with 
the insider trading profitability of its outside directors. 
                                                     
11 An extreme case would be when pure insiders can completely transfer all their private information to outside 
directors at no cost. Thus, outside directors essentially become pure insiders and the effect of public information 
transparency on the informational advantage would be the same for pure insiders and outside directors, i.e. the 
informational advantage (and therefore the trading profitability) decreases with public information transparency as 





Controlling for Unobservable Outside Director Characteristics 
A key feature of this paper’s research design is that I focus on outside directors sitting on 
at least two boards and for each director I compare her trading profitability across the different 
firms she serves to control for unobservable outside director characteristics. Prior literature finds 
that a significant portion of insider trading profitability is explained by individual characteristics 
of the insider (Hillier, Korzack and Korzack, 2013); in addition, unobservable outside director 
characteristics are likely to be correlated with both their trading profitability and the firms’ 
public information environment. Specifically, firms with more transparent public information 
could attract directors who put more weight on the information environment when deciding 
whether to accept the board positions. These outside directors therefore would be more likely to 
acquire and process firm-specific information and make more profitable trades. In other words, 
the higher trading profitability of these directors is not driven by the firm’s public information 
environment, but by their inclination to gather and process information.12
To use an outside director as her own control, I test whether an outside director’s 
differential level of trading profitability across the firms she serves is positively associated with 
 
                                                     
12 The fact that outside directors sit on boards of firms with different level of public information transparency 
suggests that the matching between outside directors and firms on information environment is imperfect. This is not 
surprising given that there are many factors that may affect an outside director’s decision to join a firm, examples 
include (but not limited to) reputation and prestige (Fama, 1980), learning opportunities (Beasley et al., 2010) and 
networking (Beasley et al., 2010). However, to the extent that information environment may be one of the factors 
that determine the matching between outside directors and firms, controlling for such matching is important in 
addressing the potential bias caused by it. 
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the differential level of public information transparency across those firms. Specifically, I first 
take a pair of firms (e.g. Firm A and Firm B) that share the same outside director. Then, I 
compute the trading profitability of that director at Firm A and Firm B, respectively. Next, I take 
the difference in the director’s trading profitability between Firm A and Firm B. I then compute 
the differential level of public information transparency between Firm A and Firm B using an 
approach similar to the one I use to compute differential level of trading profitability.13 To test 
whether the differential trading profitability of the same outside director is associated with the 
differential level of public information transparency between the two firms,14
Dif_Profit=α+β1Dif_Public_Information_Transparency+∑βkDif_Controls+ϵ,                         (1)                                                                                                       
 I estimate the 
following regression: 
where Dif_Profit and Dif_Public_Information_Transparency indicates the differential levels of 
trading profitability and public information transparency, respectively. 
Thus, a positive association between the difference in trading profitability and the 
difference in public information transparency indicates that the same outside director’s trading 
profitability is higher at the firm with higher public information transparency. 
Measuring Outside Director Trading Profitability 
The measure for an outside director’s trading profitability at each firm is computed as the 
average of her open market trading returns during the trading years. The specific steps are the 
following: first, for each trade the director has made, I calculate the buy-and-hold returns over 
the three-month, six-month, nine-month and twelve-month horizons starting from the trading 
                                                     
13 The details of computing the levels of trading profitability and public information transparency are discussed in 
the next two sections of this chapter. 
14 For outside directors sitting on more than two boards, the differences are taken between each pair of firms. Thus, 
for an outside director who serves on N boards, the number of observations for that director is N*(N-1)/2.  In my 
sample, the number of directors who serve 2, 3, 4, 5 firms are 487, 92, 18 and 2, respectively. To account for the 
potential correlation of error terms within each director, I cluster the standard errors by director. 
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date.15 This raw return is then adjusted by subtracting the buy-and-hold returns of the relevant 
CRSP’s NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ capitalization-based decile portfolio.16
Next, I average the returns for the trades made during each year. Lastly, for each director-
firm, the yearly average returns are averaged to arrive at the trading profitability of the outside 
director at the firm (Buy/Sell_Ret_3m, Buy/Sell_Ret_6m, Buy/Sell_Ret_9m, Buy/Sell_Ret_12m).  
 For outside director 
sales, I multiply the returns by negative one because conceptually the profitability of sales is the 
potential loss avoided. Trades made on the same date are considered one transaction. Thus, this 
measure captures the timing ability of outside directors when making their trading decisions.  
Measuring Public Information Transparency 
There are many components to a firm’s public information environment, and prior 
literature provides limited theoretical and/or empirical evidence on which specific types or 
sources of information are (most) helpful for the improvement of outside directors’ information 
sets. For example, in their review of the literature on the information acquisition of board 
members, Armstrong et al. (2010) conjecture that “…regulators, analysts, the media and other 
information intermediaries” are all “likely to assist outside directors” in information collection. 
Therefore, rather than analyzing each and every piece of public information, I choose to measure 
the overall transparency of a firm’s public information environment. In particular, I examine the 
quality or transparency of two types of public information that are most likely able to capture the 
                                                     
15 I compute the returns over different horizons because one cannot identify which sale of an outside director is 
related to a particular prior purchase. Also, under Rule 16(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, insiders 
have to give up any profit earned from a transaction that is offset within six months.  
16 An alternative is to use the Fama-French Four Factor Model to estimate abnormal returns. Using this approach 
requires an estimation period prior to the trading dates, yet the daily factor returns are volatile and therefore requires 
a long estimation period to yield stable estimates (e.g., Womack 1996). Therefore, I use size-adjusted returns and 
control for firm characteristics such as book-to-market ratio. As a robustness check, I use estimation periods of 365 
and 730 trading days and the results are qualitatively similar, albeit weaker (see Chapter 7 for more details). 
17 
 
transparency of a firm’s overall information environment, although the information sources of 
outside directors may include but not be limited to these information types. 
The first type is financial statements. It is well documented that financial statements are 
an important source of public information and are useful for the valuation and investment 
decisions of security holders (SFAC No. 8, Chapter 1. FASB, 2010; Kothari, 2001; Beyer et al., 
2010). Therefore, the quality of a firm’s financial statements captures an important aspect of the 
transparency of its public information environment. Given that trading profitability captures 
outside directors’ information about their firms’ valuation, I choose to examine the usefulness of 
financial statements in facilitating valuation decisions. In particular, I measure the transparency 
of financial statements using the ability of the components of accounting earnings to predict 
future cash flows. The ability of a firm to generate cash flows is directly related to its valuation. 
Therefore, the Financial Accounting Standard Board (FASB) states that “existing investors, 
lenders, and other creditors use financial information to assess the reporting entity's prospects for 
future net cash inflows to the entity. Such information may be used to estimate the value of the 
reporting entity” (SFAC No.8, FASB, 2010). Specifically, I follow Barth et al. (2001) and 
estimate the following regression by year and Fama-French 48 industry: 
CFt+1=α + β1CFt + β2ΔARt +  β3ΔINVTt +  β2ΔAPt +  β2DPAMt +  β2OTHERt + ϵ,                (2)  
where CF is net cash flow from operating activities less the accrual portion of extraordinary 
items and discontinued operations; ΔAR is change in accounts receivable; ΔINVT is change in 
inventory; ΔAP is change in accounts payable; DPAM denotes depreciation and amortization 
expense, and OTHER refers to other accrual components of earnings before extraordinary items 
and discontinued operations (EARN), calculated as EARN-(CF +ΔAR  + ΔINV – ΔAP – DPAM). 
The absolute value of the error terms (Predict_CF) from equation (2) measures the ability of 
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accounting accrual items in forecasting future cash flows; higher absolute error indicates lower 
forecasting ability. 
A second type of public information that is representative of a firm’s public information 
environment is information from financial analysts. Financial analysts are trained professionals 
who contribute to firms’ public information environment both by releasing new information and 
by interpreting information that is already available (Asquith et al., 2005; Lehavy et al., 2011). It 
is well documented that various components in the analyst reports are informative to capital 
market participants.17 Specifically, I examine the number of analysts following the firm 
(N_Analyst) and the dispersion and error of analyst forecasts (Dispersion and FC_Error). Higher 
analyst following indicates more information from financial analysts, and higher dispersion and 
forecast error indicate lower precision or quality of analyst forecasts.18
I compute the financial statement transparency measures as of the beginning of each 
trading year, and the proxies for analyst information quality are measured for forecasts 
outstanding as of the 30th day subsequent to prior year’s earnings announcement (Givoly et al., 
2009).
 




                                                     
17See Ramnath, Rock and Shane (2008) for a review of this literature. 
18 See Appendix for the specifics in the construction of the measures. 
19 The results are robust to using forecasts outstanding on the 60th, 90th and 120th days subsequent to prior years’ 
earnings announcements.  
20 Although I merely aim to use the quality of financial statements and analyst information as proxies for the 
transparency of a firm’s public information environment, each proxy does measure the quality of a specific type of 
information. I conjecture that the importance of these two types of public information is not the same for outside 
directors. This is because financial statements are firm-generated public information whereas analyst reports contain 
expert inputs from financial analysts. The likelihood that an outside director can acquire information of the same 
content as financial statements from internal channels is higher than the probability of her getting the exact same 
information as that in analyst reports from private channels. However, exploring which specific source of public 




Controlling for Access to Private Information 
The above measures for public information transparency are likely to be correlated with 
private information quality. There are at least two reasons why this may be the case. First, prior 
studies suggest that the majority of firms use the same accounting information for internal 
decision making and external financial reporting (Shroff, 2011; Dichev et al., 2012). Second, 
managers who have the incentive to provide opaque information to outsiders are also likely to 
have the incentive to hide information from their board members. Therefore, it is important to 
control for outside directors’ access to private information. Prior studies and survey evidence 
suggest that outside directors generally rely on both formal and informal channels to acquire 
private information (Beasley et al., 2009; Cao et al., 2012). Formal private information channels 
refer to communication that happens within the working environment, such as board and 
committee meetings, and informal private information channels refer to communication that 
happens outside of the working environment, such as social interactions between outside 
directors and managers. Outside directors’ opportunities to access private information through 
formal channels vary by their specific positions and/or tasks on the boards (Duellman et al., 
2011). Therefore, I control for formal access to private information using the outside director’s 
committee positions: audit committee (Audit_Committee), compensation committee 
(Compen_Committee) and nomination committee (Nomin_Committee). The opportunity to 
access informal private information channels also differs among outside directors. Sociological 
research suggests that the frequency of social interactions between two people depends on 
numerous factors including similarities in personal traits and the existence of social connections 
(McPherson, Smith-Lovin and Cook, 2001). I therefore control for an outside director’s informal 
access to private information using the existence of a social connection with the CEO (Tie; Cao 
et al., 2011). Specifically, an outside director is considered “socially connected” with the CEO if 
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she and the CEO have 1) previously worked at the same firm other than the one for which she is 
currently the outside director, 2) gone to the same university and/or 3) been in the same charity, 
club or other not-for-profit organizations.21
Other Control Variables 
 
I control for various firm characteristics:22
For each director-firm, I measure the variables as of the beginning of the purchase years 
and take the average across those years. Then I take the difference between the firms that share 
the same outside director. 
 firm complexity (stock return volatility: 
Ret_Vol, market-to-book ratio: MTB, R&D intensity: RND, leverage: Leverage, intensity of 
intangible assets: Intangibles, number of business segments: N_Segments, firm size: Size, 
industry concentration: Ind_Concentration, geographical concentration: Geo_Concentration 
[Bushman et al., 2004]); firm performance (return on assets: ROA); corporate governance 
mechanisms (total number of people on board: Board_Size, percentage of outside directors on 
board: Board_Indep, percentage of institutional holdings: Institution, and restrictions on insider 
trading: Restrict [Roulstone, 2003]); and insider trading characteristics (average open market 
purchase or sales returns of managers: Inside_Ret, and total number of insiders making open 
market trades: N_People_Purchase/Sale). Controlling for the insider trading characteristics is 
important in making sure that my results are not driven by the overall trading profits of insiders. I 
also control for the average dollar value of the outside director’s purchases during the year 
(Tran_Size), and outside director industry expertise (Ind_Expert), which may vary depending on 
the firm she serves and likely affects her information acquisition. 
                                                     
21 I acknowledge that these variables are noisy proxies for the quality of private information an outside director 
acquires. I further address the concern that the public information transparency measures may be capturing the 
quality of private information in Chapter 6. 




 The design of averaging trading profitability and public information transparency at the 
director-firm level across all trading years deserves some further discussion. An alternative to 
this design would be selecting specific events of the releasing of public information and 
examining the trading profitability right after the events. Although this design may generate 
sharper inferences regarding causality, I choose not to use it for the following reasons. First, this 
alternative design requires selecting specific public information events that are expected to be 
informative to outside directors. However, as discussed above, it is ex ante not clear which 
specific type of public information is used by outside directors—prior theoretical and empirical 
studies provide limited guidance on this issue. Thus, I choose instead to examine the 
transparency of the overall public information environment and use proxies that most likely 
capture such transparency. Second, this alternative design would exclude trades that do not occur 
shortly after any specific public information event, yet there is no reason to assume that those 
trades are solely based on internal information.23
                                                     
23 For the initial purchase sample, only 3,240 out of 50,250 trades happen within 5 days after earnings 
announcements. Thus, confining trades to be shortly after certain information events would significantly reduce the 
number of trades included in the study. 




SAMPLE AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Sample Selection 
I start from a sample of board members from BoardEx. BoardEx covers 14,864 firms 
with 97,802 outside directors from 2000 to 2010. Insider trading data are obtained from 
Thompson Insider Filing dataset. I include only open market purchases and open market sales 
not related to option exercises. The intersection of BoardEx and Thompson Insider Filing dataset 
yields 4,869 firms and 23,502 outside directors.24
Descriptive Statistics 
 Requiring the outside directors to sit on at least 
two boards yields 3,707 outside directors serving 3,661 firms. There are 1,486 outside directors 
(at 2,031 firms) who have made at least one open market trade at each firm they serve. I also 
require that firms have available data from Compustat and CRSP to compute the size-adjusted 
returns and the control variables (1,767 firms and 1,237 outside directors). Constructing the 
public information environment variables further reduces the sample to 921 firms and 599 
outside directors.  
Firm characteristics 
Tables 1.1 through 1.3 report descriptive statistics on firm characteristics. Table 1.1 
compares my sample firms with firms that are at the intersection of Compustat and CRSP. 
Overall, my sample firms are considerably larger (mean assets of $9,362.08 million compared to 
                                                     
24 Outside directors from BoardEx are merged with Thompson Insider Filing dataset using director names. 
23 
 
$2236.75 million for Compustat and CRSP intersection firms), more profitable (mean ROA of 
0% vs. -8%), and have higher institutional ownership (mean ownership of 72% vs. 44%) and 
higher analyst following (7.65 vs. 4.76 on average).25
Table 1.2 and Table 1.3 report the same firm characteristics for my sample firms in years 
during which at least one outside director in my sample has made a purchase (Table 1.2) or sale 
(Table 1.3). There is no drastic difference between the information environment in trade years 
vs. non-trade years: the mean stock return volatility in purchase years is statistically higher than 
it is in non-purchase years (0.0301 vs. 0.0298), yet the magnitude of the difference is small 
(0.0003). Also, the median stock return volatilities are not statistically different. There is also no 
significant difference between share turnover for purchase years and non-purchase years. Firms 
in purchase years have higher mean analyst forecast error (0.74 vs. 0.59) and forecast dispersion 
(0.0410 vs. 0.0396), but there is no significant difference in the medians. Overall, it does not 
appear that the trades made by outside directors in my sample happen in years that the firms are 
in particularly volatile or uncertain states. 
 
The differences between sale and non-sale years in Table 1.3 are overall similar to the 
differences between purchase and non-purchase years in Table 1.2. One notable difference is that 
outside directors in my sample tend to make purchases when the market-to-book ratio is lower 
and when the firm is less profitable (lower ROA), whereas they tend to make sales when the 
firms have higher market-to-book ratios and higher ROAs. This is consistent with the evidence 
found by prior studies that insiders are contrarians (Piotroski and Roulstone, 2005). 
 
 
                                                     




Outside director characteristics 
The sample selection process requires that the outside directors in my sample sit on at 
least two boards and have traded the stocks of at least two firms that they serve. Ex ante, this 
requirement should result in my sample including outside directors who are more reputable 
(Kaplan and Reishus, 1990) and are more inclined to trade. Therefore, it is likely that they are 
more sophisticated compared to their peers. The statistics in Table 2 confirm this expectation. In 
particular, Table 2 compares individual characteristics of my sample outside directors with the 
outside directors who are on the same boards with the sample directors but are not included in 
my final sample (“peer directors”). Although the numbers of years the sample outside directors 
have spent on their firms are lower relative to their peers (1.71 years of difference in the mean), 
they tend to hold more committee positions (1.39 vs. 1.18 on average), are more likely to be 
designated as the financial expert on the audit committee (0.26 vs. 0.15 on average) and are more 
likely to have worked in another firm that is in the same industry as the current firm (0.12 vs. 
0.08 on average).26
Table 3 reports the absolute values of the differences of variables in my regressions 
between pairs of firms that share the same outside director.
  
27
                                                     
26 The statistical significance of the differences in medians of the variables in Table 2 are computed using the 
Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney Rank Sum test, which is similar to an independent sample T-test, except that it makes no 
parametric assumption regarding the underlying distribution of the variables. The test addresses whether the 
distribution of the variables across the two groups are statistically significant; therefore, even when the medians 
across the two groups are the same (for example, the number of committee chairs, whether the director is the audit 
committee expert, whether the director is an industry expert and whether the director is female), the underlying 
distribution could still be statistically different. However, the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test does assume 
independence between groups. To test whether the independence assumption is violated, I conduct a bootstrap test in 
which I randomly assign directors into “sample” group and “peer” group and repeat the process for 50 times. The 
results (untabulated) show that the statistical significance of the differences in the medians of the individual 
characteristics across the “sample” group and the “peer” group does not change from that reported in Table 2; 
therefore, it does not appear that the independence assumption is driving the differences. 
 Outside directors can sit on boards 
27 The variables in my regression are signed differences. However, reporting the distributions of the signed 
differences is not informative because the positive differences would be offset by the negative differences. Therefore 
I report the differences in absolute values. 
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of firms with big differences in size (the mean of the absolute difference in the log of market 
capital is 2.14, suggesting that one firm is more than twice the size as the other). There is also 
reasonable variation in public information transparency measures across the firms that share the 
same outside director: for example, the average absolute differences in N_Analyst and FC_Error 
are 5.37 and 0.93, which account for 70% and 148% of the average levels (per Table 1.1) 
respectively. 
 Outside director trading characteristics 
The individual characteristics reported in Table 2 suggest that the outside directors in my 
sample are likely to be more financially sophisticated compared to their peers. Therefore, it is not 
surprising that they are able to make more profitable trades as shown in Table 4.1. In particular, 
Tables 4.1 and 4.2 compare the trading profitability, trading size and trading frequency of the 
sample outside directors with their peers. Table 4.1 (4.2) reports the statistics for purchases 
(sales). The mean (median) differences between buy-and-hold size adjusted returns of purchases 
made by the sample outside directors and the returns made by their peers are 2% to 10% (2% to 
7%) depending on the horizon. The sample outside directors also tend to trade in larger size, and 
the number of trades they make at each firm per year (“frequency”) tends to be smaller. Overall, 
the statistics in Table 4.1 suggest that outside directors in my sample have better timing abilities 
when making purchases. 
However, these outside directors do not appear to be more informed than their peers are 
when making sales (Table 4.2). The mean (median) returns made by the sample outside directors 
are close to zero and are not significantly different (are significantly lower) compared to the 
mean (median) returns made by their peers. These statistics suggest that purchases of these 
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directors are more likely to reflect their superior information than are sales. I examine the nature 





Tables 5.1 and 5.2 report the results from estimating Equation (1). Table 5.1 presents 
analyses on purchases and Table 5.2 reports results on sales. The results in Table 5.1 suggest that 
outside director purchase returns over the three-month and six-month horizons are negatively 
associated with the absolute error of financial statement items in predicting future cash flows 
(Dif_Predict_CF), and that analyst forecast error (Dif_FC_Error) is negatively associated with 
outside director purchase returns over the six, nine and twelve-month horizons. There is no 
significant association between analyst following or forecast dispersion and purchase 
profitability. Overall, the evidence is consistent with transparent public information environment 
helps increase outside directors’ informational advantage and trading profitability. The economic 
magnitudes are also meaningful. One standard deviation changes in Dif_Predict_CF and 
Dif_FC_Error are associated with 0.10 and 0.11 standard deviation changes, respectively, in the 
six-month differential purchase profitability. The standard deviation of differences in six-month 
purchase returns is 28 percentage points in my sample, and the average difference is 30 
percentage points. Thus, the 0.10 and 0.11 standard deviation changes amount to 2.8 and 3.1 
percentage points of differences in returns, respectively. In other words, the outside director 
makes about three percentage points higher returns at the more transparent firm when the 
differential public information transparency between the two firms increases by one standard 
deviation. This accounts for 9.3% and 10.3% of the average absolute difference in six-month 
returns an outside director makes across two firms.  
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In contrast to the evidence on open market purchases, there is no significant association 
between the public information measures and outside director sales profitability (Table 5.2). This 
result mirrors the descriptive statistics in Table 4.2 that suggest that outside directors in my 
sample do not appear to be making the sales based on superior information they have. This 
finding is also consistent with prior insider trading research that suggests that insider sales are 





There are several potential alternative explanations to the documented positive 
association between public information transparency and outside director purchase profitability. 
In particular, the association could be driven by: 1) litigation risk faced by outside directors that 
are correlated with both their trading decisions and the transparency of a firm’s information 
environment; 2) the measures of public information transparency merely capturing the 
unobservable quality of private communication between outside directors and pure insiders; 3) 
outside directors who make superior trading returns being more informed and therefore more 
effective in improving their firms’ public information environment (i.e. reverse causality); 4) the 
measures of public information transparency merely capturing the predictability of firm 
performance; 5) the measures of public information transparency merely capturing the liquidity 
of the firm’s stocks (and therefore the cost to trading its stocks); 6) the positive association 
merely capturing the ability of the public information transparency measures in predicting future 
stock returns; 7) the sample selection and/or research design. In this chapter I address these 
concerns. 
Litigation Risk 
 The tests I conduct on outside directors’ trading profitability is predated on outside directors 
choosing to trade, without explicitly modeling such choices. This raises the possibility that the results 
in Tables 5.1 and 5.2 might be driven by some factor that is correlated with both outside 
directors’ choices to trade on their private information and their firms’ public information 
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environment. One potential factor is litigation risk. Specifically, Skinner (1997) and Field et al. 
(2005) find that transparent public information deters securities litigation. As a result, outside 
directors may be more comfortable trading in firms with more transparent public information and 
therefore reap higher returns.28
 The results in Tables 6.1 through 6.4 do not support this alternative explanation for 
outside director purchases. The effects of financial statement transparency and analyst forecast 
errors on purchase profitability for firm-pairs with high differential litigation risk are not stronger 
than the effects for firm-pairs with low differential litigation risk. For outside director sales, 
 To address this possibility, I examine whether the association 
between public information transparency and outside director trading profitability is affected by 
litigation risk. Specifically, I create an index that measures the firm’s ex ante litigation risk. The 
index includes variables that predict litigation risk as documented by Kim and Skinner (2011): 
stock return volatility, stock return skewness, sales growth, stock turnover and absolute market-
adjusted returns. For the pairs of firms that share the same outside director, I obtain the percentile 
rankings of the absolute differences in each of these variables and the index is the sum of these 
rankings. In other words, a higher ranking (higher index) of a pair of firms indicates a larger 
difference between the litigation risk of the two firms in the pair. I then partition my sample into 
firm-pairs with absolute differences in litigation risk that are above and below the median (“high 
difference in litigation risk” vs. “low difference in litigation risk”). If differences in public 
information transparency merely capture differences in litigation risk, then the association 
between public information transparency and outside director trading profitability should be 
stronger for the firm-pairs that have higher differences in litigation risk. 
                                                     
28 Prior studies find that although the principal sanction from lawsuits against directors is not direct financial loss 
(Black et al., 2004), the harm to reputation is significant (Fama, 1980; Srinivasan, 2005; Fich and Shivdasani, 2007). 
Therefore, it is plausible that outside directors take litigation risk into account when making their trading decisions 
(Brochet, 2010; Huddart, Ke and Shi, 2007). 
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Table 6.5 reports that for firm-pairs with differential litigation risk above the median, more 
transparent financial statement information is associated with higher sales profitability for the 
three-month horizon, whereas financial statement transparency is not associated with sales 
profitability for firm-pairs with low difference in litigation risk. However, there is no significant 
difference across the two subsamples when sales returns are measured in longer horizons. 
The results in Tables 6.1 through 6.8 highlight an interesting difference between the 
outside directors’ purchases and sales in my sample. Table 6.5 suggests that transparent public 
information (in particular financial statement information) does play a role in mitigating the 
litigation concerns faced by outside directors when making sales, particularly in the short 
horizon. However, this role is not reflected in outside director purchases (Tables 6.1 through 
6.4). This is consistent with litigation concern for insider purchases being not as severe as it is 
for sales (Noe, 1999; Cheng and Lo, 2006; Brochet, 2010). In other words, the role of transparent 
public information in reducing litigation concern becomes less important if outside directors are 
not as concerned about litigation risk when making purchases to begin with. Overall, the results 
in Tables 6.5 through 6.8 together with the statistics in Table 4.2 highlight the fact that litigation 
risk is a prominent feature of sales but not of purchases. Thus, in subsequent tests, I focus on 
outside director purchases. 
Correlation between Public and Private Information Quality 
Public information transparency and private information access 
The main regression results in Table 5.1 suggest that public information is associated 
with outside directors’ informational advantage underlying their purchase decisions. One 
concern when interpreting these results is that public information transparency may be correlated 
with (unobservable) private information quality. Specifically, the same information system of a 
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firm generates both public and private information (Dichev et al., 2012), and managers’ incentive 
to disclose public information to equity investors could be correlated with their incentive to 
communicate private information to outside directors. I conduct the following tests to address 
this concern. 
First, I explore whether outside directors’ access to private information affects the 
association between public information transparency and their trading profitability. If public 
information transparency merely captures the quality of unobservable private information of 
outside directors’, then the association should be stronger when outside directors have more 
chances to access private information. On the contrary, if my tests indeed capture the effect of 
the public information environment, the association should be weaker. This is because the more 
chances an outside director gets to acquire internal information, the closer her position is to the 
pure insiders. Thus, it is more likely that the information she collects from private channels can 
subsume or supplant public information, as is the case for pure insiders. 
I separately examine outside directors’ formal and informal private information channels. 
To measure an outside director’s formal access to private information, I use the number of board 
committees she sits on (Duellman et al. 2011). A higher number of committee positions indicates 
a higher level of involvement in board activities, thus more opportunities to acquire private 
information. In Table 7.1, I interact the difference in the number of committee positions held by 
the outside director between the two firms (Dif_Committee) with the difference in the public 
information variables.29
                                                     
29 The number of committee positions held by an outside director at a firm equals 1, 2, and 3 respectively for an 
outside director who sits on one, two and all three of audit, compensation and nomination committees. Thus, 
Dif_Committee is the difference in Committee between the two firms that the outside director serves. 
 For brevity, I report the test results on six-month and twelve-month 
purchase returns. The table shows that the effects of analyst following, forecast dispersion and 
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forecast error on twelve-month purchase returns are mitigated by Dif_Committee.30
The opportunity to access private information may vary across different committee 
positions. Audit committee members are in charge of overseeing the financial reporting and 
internal control system and therefore frequently communicate with internal and external auditors, 
whereas compensation committee members frequently communicate with compensation 
consultants. Nomination committee members, however, are in charge of searching and 
nominating board members and frequently rely on search firms and focus on the “chemistry” 
between the candidates and the existing board members (Clune et al., 2013). Therefore, the role 
of nomination committee members is arguably more ceremonial compared to the roles of 
compensation and audit committee members, and the opportunity to acquire private information 
regarding the firm’s performance and valuation is arguable lower for nomination committee 
members than members of the other two committees.
 This is 
consistent with the prediction that public information quality is less important for outside 
directors who have greater access to private information through formal channels. 
31 Following this logic, in Table 7.2 I 
include only audit committee and compensation committee members when constructing the 
Dif_Committee variable and the results are still consistent with my prediction.32
I then examine an outside director’s access to informal private information channels. I 
use social connections between the outside director and the CEO (Tie) as a proxy for the 
opportunity to interact with corporate insiders in social occasions (Cao et al., 2012). Specifically, 
BoardEx provides information on three types of social connections: connections via employment 
  
                                                     
30 The results for nine-month returns are similar to those for twelve-month returns and the results for three-months 
returns are similar to those for six-month returns. 
31 Although all board members get the opportunity to share their information with the board during board meetings, 
it is unlikely that information acquired separately by each outside director gets transferred in full to the entire board 
(Hansen, 1999). 
32 There is no significant interaction effect between Dif_Committee and the information variables when including 
only one of the three committees.  
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(i.e., worked at the same firm other than the current one), education (i.e., went to the same 
university) and social activities (i.e., have participated in the same clubs, charities and/or other 
organizations).  
I interact the difference in the existence of an outside director’s connections with the 
CEOs between the two firms she serves (Dif_Tie). The results are shown in Table 7.3. The effect 
of financial statement transparency (Dif_Predict_CF) is mitigated by Dif_Tie both for six-month 
and twelve-month purchase returns. Again, the evidence mitigates the concern that it is the 
correlated omitted private information quality that drives my results, as long as the correlation 
between unobservable private information quality and my proxies for public information 
transparency do not vary based on the number of committee positions an outside director has, or 
the existence of social connections between the outside director and the CEO. 
High cyclicality vs. low cyclicality firms 
To lend further support to the validity of my measures (in particular, the analyst 
information measures) in capturing the effect of public information, I examine a situation where 
I expect the content of analyst information to be more useful to outside directors. Specifically, 
prior research finds that financial analysts have an advantage in interpreting macroeconomic data 
compared to corporate insiders (Jennings, 1987; Hutton et al., 2012). Therefore, information on 
the macro-economy provided by analysts is likely to assist outside directors, especially when the 
firm’s operation is highly impacted by macroeconomic conditions. Accordingly, I follow Hutton 
et al. (2012) and partition the sample into two groups: firms of which earnings are more affected 
by the macro-economy (high cyclicality) and firms that are less affected by the macro-economy 
(low cyclicality). For each trading year, I measure cyclicality using the R2 from a regression of a 
firm’s earnings on GDP, energy prices and interest rate spreads over the prior twelve quarters 
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and then average the R2s across the quarters during the trading year. Thus, if high quality analyst 
information complements outside directors’ private information, one would expect the results to 
be stronger for high cyclicality firms.  
Tables 8.1 and 8.2 report the results. The effect of forecast error on six-month returns is 
significantly stronger for high cyclicality firms (Table 8.1) and the effects of forecast error and 
forecast dispersion on twelve-month returns are significantly stronger for high cyclicality firms 
(Table 8.2).33
Reverse Causality 
 The evidence is consistent with analyst information quality being more important 
for outside directors when the information provided by analysts is more relevant to evaluating 
the firm. It is unlikely that the correlation between analyst information quality and private 
information quality is stronger for high cyclicality firms. Thus, the results in Tables 8.1 and 8.2 
mitigate the concern that analyst information quality merely captures the effect of private 
information quality. 
The direction of causation in this paper runs from public information transparency to the 
outside directors’ informational advantage. I acknowledge that the direction of causality could be 
reversed: more informed outside directors generate higher trading profits; armed with their 
superior information, they become more effective in improving their firms’ information 
environment. However, I contend that the results in this paper are not consistent with this 
reversed direction of causation. Specifically, outside directors who are more involved in the 
board activities should be better able to improve the firm’s information environment. Thus, one 
would expect the association between public information transparency and outside director 
                                                     
33 The results for nine-month returns are similar to those for twelve-month returns and the results for three-months 
returns are similar to those for six-month returns. 
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trading profitability to be strengthened by the number of committee positions held by the 
director. However, the results in Tables 7.1 and 7.2 indicate the opposite. In other words, the 
results are more consistent with public information environment affecting outside director 
information sets, even though I cannot fully rule out the possibility of reverse causality. 
Controlling for Earnings Predictability 
 One potential common construct captured by my empirical proxies of public information 
transparency is the predictability of a firm’s fundamental performance. When a firm’s operation 
and performance is more predictable, so does its future cash flows; also, its analysts are likely to 
have lower uncertainty and/or disagreement regarding its future earnings. At the same time, the 
private information of outside directors’ is also likely to be more precise. In contrast, when a 
firm operates in a highly uncertain environment, it is possible that even its insiders (including 
outside directors) are clueless about its future performance. As a result, outside directors make 
lower purchase returns when their firms’ fundamental performance is hard to predict, not when 
the information environment is opaque.  
 I conduct two tests to address this concern. First, I control for the predictability of 
earnings (Predictability), measured by the absolute value of the fitted residual from an eight-year 
rolling regression of one year ahead earnings on current earnings.34
                                                     
34 The earnings are measured as earnings before extraordinary items and scaled by beginning of year total assets. 
 Table 9.1 reports the results. 
Specifically, the association between Dif_Predict_CF and  outside director purchase returns is no 
longer statistically significant. However, earnings predictability has been used widely as a 
measure for earnings quality in prior literature (see Dechow, Ge and Schrand [2010] for a 
review), and the Pearson (Spearman) correlation between Dif_Predict_CF and Dif_Predictability 
is 19% (21%). Therefore, the measure could also be capturing some aspect of public information 
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transparency, and it is difficult to distinguish the effect of one from the other.35
A second test I perform is that I remove the fundamental components of cash flow 
predictability from Predict_CF by regressing it on the standard deviation of cash flows over the 
past five years, the standard deviation of sales over the past five years, the operating cycle and 
size (Dechow and Dichev, 2002). The residual (Predict_CF_NoFund) is thus the unexplained 
portion of the ability of accounting items in predicting future cash flows by these firm 
fundamentals.
  In addition, the 
association between analyst forecast errors and profitability remains robust, and the effect of 
analyst following on the six-month purchase returns becomes marginally significant in the 
predicted direction. Overall, the evidence does not lend support to the claim that the 
predictability of firm performance drives the results. 
36
Controlling for Liquidity 
 I report the results in Table 9.2. Again, the association between this new 
measure for accounting transparency and outside director purchase returns is no longer 
statistically significant for the three and six-month horizons, and for the twelve-month horizon, 
the association is significant in the direction opposite to my prediction. The association between 
forecast errors and trading profitability remains robust. This piece of evidence combined with the 
results in Table 9.1 suggests that caution must be applied when interpreting the association 
between Dif_Predict_CF and purchase profitability. 
 Another factor that is correlated with both public information transparency and the 
trading profitability of informed traders is the liquidity or depth of the market of the firm’s stock. 
Both theory and empirical evidence suggest that stock market liquidity increases with 
                                                     
35 The association between Dif_Predictability and the trading returns is not statistically significant when not 
including Dif_Predict_CF in the regressions. 
36 See Appendix for details. 
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information transparency (Kyle, 1985; Lang, Lins and Maffett, 2009). Furthermore, an outside 
director would be more inclined to trade when the stock of her firm is more liquid (higher market 
depth) under an imperfect competition framework (Kyle, 1985). Therefore, the higher purchase 
profitability of outside directors at more transparent firms could reflect outside directors’ 
increased willingness to trade on their private information in more liquid stocks, rather than 
public information improving the precision of their overall information sets. To address this 
concern, I control for the average stock liquidity over each year prior to each trade using the 










,                                                                                                                      (3) 
where Riyd is the return on stock i on day d of year y, VOLDiyd is the respective daily volume in 
dollars, and Diy is the number of days for which data are available for stock i in year y. This ratio 
gives the absolute (percentage) price change per dollar of daily trading volume, or the daily price 
impact of the order flow. This follows Kyle’s (1985) concept of illiquidity—the response of price 
to order flow—and Silber’s (1975) measure of thinness, which is defined as the ratio of absolute 
price change to absolute excess demand for trading. I multiply the original Amihud (2002) 
measure by negative one so that higher value of Liquid indicates higher liquidity. 
 Table 10 shows that the results are not affected by stock liquidity: both Dif_Predict_CF 
and Dif_FC_Error remain statistically significant. Therefore, it does not appear that the 
transparency measures are capturing outside directors’ propensity to trade on private information 






Public Information Transparency and Future Stock Returns 
 Prior studies have documented association between information transparency and/or 
uncertainty and future firm performance and/or stock returns. For example, Li (2008) find that 
firms with more readable annual reports (therefore more transparent) demonstrate more 
persistent and positive earnings; Deither, Malloy and Scherbina (2002) find that higher analyst 
forecast dispersion leads to lower future stock returns. These studies all document that higher 
transparency leads to higher future earnings or returns, and the association between transparency 
and trading profitability documented here is only statistically significant for purchases. Hence, it 
is ex ante possible that the positive association between public information transparency and 
outside directors’ trading profitability is just reflecting the predictive ability of the information 
measures on future stock returns. 
 To verify whether it is indeed the case, I take the transparency measures and test their 
ability to predict six-month and one-year ahead stock returns. Specifically, for each year, I 
partition the sample into firms with transparency measures above the median and those with 
transparency measures below the median. Then I calculate the six-month and one-year ahead 
stock returns for each firm group. If these measures predict future stock returns without the 
timing choices of outside directors, then I would expect the firms that are in the higher 
transparency group to exhibit higher future stock returns than the firms that are in the lower 
transparency group.  
 Table 11 presents the results. The only public information transparency measure that is 
significantly associated with future stock returns in the same direction predicted in my main tests 
is analyst forecast dispersion—higher forecast dispersion (therefore lower transparency) is 
associated with lower future stock returns, confirming the findings in Diether et al. (2002). 
However, in my main tests, the association between dispersion and outside director purchase 
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profitability is never statistically significant, while the measures that do have a significant effect 
on purchase profitability (i.e. Predict_CF and FC_Error) do not appear to predict future stock 
returns on their own. In other words, the association documented in the main analyses relies on 
the timing choices of outside directors to be statistically significant. Therefore, Table 11 is 
inconsistent with the claim that the results are driven by the ability of information transparency 
to predict future returns and have nothing to do with outside directors’ superior timing ability.37
Trading Profitability of Pure Insiders and Firm Level Analysis 
 
In order to control for unobservable outside director characteristics, I require that the 
outside directors in my sample serve at least two firms. Studying their trading behavior across 
the different firms thus require that my sample outside directors have traded in at least two of the 
firms they serve. A cost to this requirement is the significant reduction in the number of firms 
and outside directors in my sample; therefore, it raises the concern that the positive association 
between transparency and trading profitability for outside directors is an artifact resulted from 
the sample selection. As discussed in Chapter 4, this requirement results in my sample firms 
being larger and operating in an overall richer information environment, and my sample directors 
being more sophisticated. It is possible that less sophisticated outside directors serving in smaller 
or more opaque firms do not have the ability or the opportunity to process public information and 
combine it with their private information sets, and therefore, my results may not be generalizable 
to all outside directors at all firms. However, the purpose of this paper is to provide evidence on 
the possibility that outside directors’ informational advantage can arise in a transparent public 
                                                     
37 In untabulated tests, I perform the same analysis by year. For Predict_CF, higher Predict_CF (i.e. lower 
transparency) is associated with lower future returns only in two out of the ten years: 2002 and 2007, and in four out 
of the ten years, Predict_CF is positively associated with futures stock returns. For FC_Error, only in 2003 and 
2009 is it negatively and significantly associated with future stock returns (and in 2001, 2002, 2007 and 2008 it is 
positively and significantly associated with future stock returns). Thus, neither proxy that is significant in the main 
analysis appears to be consistently predicting future stock returns across the sample period. 
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information environment, and highlight the existence of heterogeneity among different groups of 
corporate insiders. Hence, generalizability is not a major concern. Nevertheless, a related 
concern needs to be addressed, namely the possibility that all insiders in my sample firms make 
higher trading returns when the information environment is more transparent. In other words, it 
is not the informational position of outside directors but some special characteristics of the 
sample firms that result in the association.  
To test whether this argument is valid, I examine the purchase profitability of pure 
insiders. Table 12.1 presents the results from the regression of firm-level pure insider purchase 
profitability and the transparency of public information. The findings are consistent with prior 
literature: pure insider trading profitability decreases with public information transparency 
(Frankel and Li, 2004), except for analyst forecast error.38
Another potential alternative explanation related to the design is that the first-difference 
specification puts additional restrictions to the regression model and the documented association 
is an artifact of this model specification. To test whether this is the case, I conduct firm-level 
tests on the trading profitability of outside directors. The results in Table 12.2 are overall robust 
to this specification, except that the association between Predict_CF and Buy_Ret_3m is no 
 Specifically, analyst following 
(forecast dispersion) is negatively (positively) associated with purchase profitability of pure 
insiders. Predict_CF is also positively associated with trading profitability, yet the association is 
only statistically significant in the three-month horizon. The only measure that is statistically 
significant in the same direction as in the tests for outside directors is analyst forecast error. 
Overall, it does not appear that all insiders in my sample make higher trading returns at more 
transparent firms, thus highlighting the difference between pure insiders and outside directors. 
                                                     
38 The measure for analyst information transparency in Frankel and Li (2004) is analyst following. The results in 
Table 12.1 confirms their findings. 
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longer statistically significant. Therefore, it does not support the claim that the results in the main 





This chapter presents robustness checks of the main results in Chapter 5 using alternative 
measures for information environment transparency and trading profitability. 
Alternative Measures for Public Information Transparency 
Alternative measures for financial statement transparency: earnings-price association and 
accrual quality 
 I adopt two alternative measures for the transparency or quality of financial statements. 
The first one is the proportion of stock price that is explained by accounting earnings and book 
value (Francis and Schipper, 1999; Frankel and Li, 2004). Specifically, it is computed as the R2 
from an eight-year rolling regression of stock price three months after the fiscal year end on 
earnings and book value of equity (Value_Relevance). Using this measure is relevant for two 
reasons: first, it captures the extent to which investors incorporate accounting information when 
making their trading decisions. To the extent that the stock market is efficient, this measure 
captures the usefulness of accounting information for valuation decisions and is therefore also 
suitable for the setting of this paper. Second, Frankel and Li (2004) use this measure as their 
proxy for financial statement quality. Thus, it is informative to compare the effect of this 
measure on outside director trading profitability with that on the profitability of pure insiders. 
 Table 13.1 presents the results. There is very weak evidence that Value_Relevance is 
positively associated with the trading profitability of outside directors: the association is only 
statistically significant in one of the eight specifications (Column 3 on the six-month horizon). I 
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propose two potential reasons why the association is weaker using Value_Relevance, although 
exploring the actual reason is beyond the scope of this paper. First, the validity of 
Value_Relevance as a measure for information transparency depends on the assumption of 
market efficiency, which may not hold. Second, given that outside directors have access to 
internal information and their informational advantage comes from combining the public 
information with their private information, they may not use public information in the same way 
that equity investors do. Therefore, Value_Relevance may not capture the usefulness of financial 
statements in assisting outside directors’ valuation decisions. 
 Table 13.2 presents the results of using another measure as a proxy for financial 
statement transparency: accrual quality proposed by Dechow and Dichev (2002) and modified by 
McNichols (2002). In particular, I take the error term from a firm-specific ten-year rolling 
regression of total current accruals on lagged, current and one year ahead operating cash flows, 
changes in revenue and growth in property, plant and equipment.39
Alternative measures of analyst information quality 
 I then multiply the absolute 
value of the error term by negative one so that higher value of the measure (DD) indicates higher 
accrual quality. Overall, there is no significant association between Dif_DD and Dif_Buy_Ret, 
except for the three-month horizon, where the differential level of accrual quality is positively 
associated with the differential level of trading profitability by the same outside director, 
consistent with my hypothesis.  
 In Table 14, I use two alternative measures of analyst information quality proposed by 
Barron et al. (1998). These measures aim to capture the overall information environment faced 
by analysts. The first is the analysts’ overall information uncertainty (Overall_Uncertainty). 
                                                     
39 See also the Appendix for details of this measure. 
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Barron et al. (1998) posit that the uncertainty faced by analysts (i.e. analysts’ expected variance 
of a firm’s earnings conditional on her available information) consists of two components: 
common uncertainty and idiosyncratic uncertainty. The former captures the precision of 
information shared by all analysts and the latter measures the precision of each analyst’s private 
information. The overall uncertainty is the sum of the two sources of uncertainty and captures the 
precision or quality of common and idiosyncratic information that gets incorporated in analyst 
forecasts. The second is analysts’ common information uncertainty (Common_Uncertainty), 
which measures only the precision or quality of information shared by all analysts.40
 The results in Table 14 are consistent with my hypothesis. Both Dif_Overall_Unertainty 
and Dif_Common_Uncertainty are significantly correlated with Dif_Buy_Ret in the six, nine and 
twelve-month horizons: the higher the transparency of the information environment faced by 
analysts, the larger the informational advantage of outside directors. 
 
Alternative Measures of Trading Profitability 
 In the main tests I use the size-adjusted returns to measure outside director trading 
profitability and control for risk factors such as size and book-to-market ratio. One alternative 
would be using the Fama-French Four Factor Model (Fama and French, 1993). I do not use this 
alternative in my main analysis because it requires an estimation period prior to the trading dates, 
yet the daily factor returns are volatile and therefore it requires a long estimation period (e.g., 60 
months prior to the trading date as in Womack [1996]) to yield stable coefficient estimates 
(Ravina and Sapienza, 2010). Using such a long estimation period significantly reduces my 
sample size. Therefore, in Table 15 I use estimation periods of 365 (Dif_Buy_FFRet_6m1) and 
                                                     





 The association between analyst forecast error and outside 
director purchase profitability is robust to these alternative specifications, whereas the 
association between financial statement transparency and purchase profitability is no longer 
statistically significant. 
 The analyses in this chapter and the previous chapter suggest that overall, the effects of 
analyst information quality measures appear to be more robust than those of the financial 
statement transparency measures. I put forward one potential explanation of this phenomenon, 
although it is beyond the scope of this paper to explore the reason. In this paper, both groups of 
measures are supposed to capture the transparency of the overall information environment, yet 
each group is still capturing different sources of public information. It is possible that financial 
statement information is not as helpful as information from analysts in assisting outside directors. 
This is not surprising given that many firms require outside directors to approve their quarterly 
financial statements before they are made public, and all firms require board approval before 
releasing their 10-K filings. Thus, information in the financial statements would be easily 
substituted by information from internal channels. In contrast, analyst reports contain expert 
inputs of financial analysts that offer additional insight to firm performance and valuation that 
may not be easily substituted by private information (Hutton et al., 2012).  
                                                     





This paper studies whether outside directors reap higher insider trading returns when a 
firm is in a more transparent public information environment. By comparing the same outside 
director’s trading profitability across all the different firms she serves, I find that the same 
outside director makes higher open market purchase returns at firms with more transparent 
public information. I interpret the results as suggesting that transparent public information can 
help outside directors form information sets that are superior to the information sets of investors. 
Further analyses indicate that the results are not driven by potential unobservable factors that are 
correlated with both trading profitability and pubic information transparency, such as the quality 
of private information, litigation risk, predictability of firm performance and stock liquidity. The 
results—in particular the association between analyst forecast error and purchase profitability—
are also robust to firm-level analyses and alternative measures of information transparency and 
abnormal trading returns. 
This paper extends prior insider trading literature by exploring the source of outside 
directors’ informational advantage. In particular, it is taken as a given by prior literature that 
insiders have superior information, and the source of such information is widely assumed to be 
from internal channels. This paper shows that for outside directors, informational advantage can 
arise in a transparent public information environment. This finding highlights the existence of a 
spectrum of informational positions of corporate insiders and the heterogeneity in how the 
informational advantage may arise for different insiders along the spectrum.  
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The complementary effect between public and private information for outside directors 
also speaks to the theoretical literature on whether public information crowds out or triggers 
private information acquisition (Verrecchia, 1982; Diamond, 1985; Kim and Verrecchia, 1994). 
This paper, together with prior literature (Frankel and Li, 2004), suggests that both scenarios can 
happen in the insider trading setting, and which particular scenario dominates depends on the 
specific informational position of the insider: for pure insiders who are directly involved in 
managing the firm, the chances of getting private information that can subsume and/or supplant 
public information is high, and more transparent public information would reduce their 
informational advantage; for outside directors who are relatively remote from their firm’s daily 
operation, transparent public information can facilitate further private information acquisition, 
and interpreting public information with the help of private information can generate superior 
overall information sets. 
One caveat of interpreting the findings of this paper is that the evidence does not point to 
any particular source or type of public information that is useful for outside directors. The 
evidence only suggests that the transparency of the overall public information environment can 
give rise to outside directors’ informational advantage.42
Another interesting question related to the topic of this paper is how outside directors use 
their informational advantage in their roles as advisors and monitors. A large literature in 
corporate governance examines the association between the transparency of a firm’s information 
 The question of which particular source 
of information is useful for outside directors and why it is useful could be explored by future 
research. 
                                                     
42 It appears from the robustness of the results that analyst information is more useful for outside directors than 
financial statement information; however, the research design in this paper cannot give direct evidence on outside 
directors’ usage of any particular type of information. 
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environment and the percentage of outside directors on its board, with the implicit assumption 
that the information would be useful for outside directors to be effective monitors and/or 
advisors.43
  
 The focus of this paper is on the source rather than the use of outside directors’ 
information; however, the results suggest that public information could potentially be one source 
of information for the monitoring/advising roles of outside directors and this issue would be 
interesting for future research to explore. 
                                                     
43 See for example, Vafeas (2000) Ahmed and Duellman (2007), Boone et al. (2007), Petra (2007), Coles et al. 
(2008), Linck et al. (2008), Cai et al. (2009), Duchin et al. (2010), Ferreira et al. (2011). See also Armstrong et al. 
(2010) and Adams et al. (2010) for a review of this literature.  
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Substitutes     
Private Information
(1) Precision of Investors' Information Increase Increase
(2) Precision of Insiders' Information Increase No Effect
(3) Insider's Informaitonal Advantage ((2)-(1)) Unclear Decrease
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Table 1.1: Comparing Sample Firms with Firms that Have Both Compustat and CRSP Data 
 
Note: This table presents presents firm characteristics in my sample and compares them with firms that are in the intersection of Compustat and CRSP. The unit 
of observation is firm-year. Three statistics are presented: the mean, the median and the standard deviation. For each statistic, the first column presents firms in 
the intersection between Compustat and CRSP, and the second column presents firms in my sample. The third column (if applicable) presents the difference 
between the sample firms and firms with Compustat and CRSP data (sample firms – Compustat & CRSP firms). ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 
1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Assets are total assets (in millions); Sales are net sales (in millions); Market_Cap is price per share multiplied by the 
number of shares outstanding (in millions) as of the fiscal year end date; Spread is the average daily bid-ask spread scaled by price over the fiscal year; Turnover 








CRSP data Sample firms
Firms with 
Compustat and 
CRSP data Sample firms Difference
Firms with 
Compustat and 
CRSP data Sample firms Difference
Firms with 
Compustat and 
CRSP data Sample firms
Assets 44,321 8,501 2,236.75 9,362.08 7125.33*** 277.29 1,933.47 1656.18*** 8,424.61 18,903.37
Sales 44,270 8,501 1,087.14 5,214.67 4127.53*** 131.23 1,391.51 1260.28*** 3,713.02 8,854.92
Market_Cap 44,303 8,501 1,326.50 6,645.54 5319.04*** 170.50 1,733.28 1562.78*** 4,777.14 11,733.70
Leverage 44,189 8,501 0.15 0.19 0.04*** 0.07 0.15 0.08*** 0.19 0.19
MTB 44,256 8,501 2.46 3.21 0.75*** 1.67 2.30 0.63*** 3.61 3.94
RND 44,312 8,501 0.05 0.05 -0.00*** 0.00 0.00 0.00*** 0.12 0.10
ROA 44,260 8,501 -0.08 0.00 0.08*** 0.01 0.04 0.03*** 0.32 0.20
Intangibles 43,882 8,501 0.80 0.77 -0.03*** 0.89 0.84 -0.05*** 0.23 0.21
N_Segments 37,098 8,501 2.21 2.85 0.64*** 1.00 3.00 2.00*** 1.59 1.93
Geo_Concentration 28,906 8,501 0.77 0.65 -0.12*** 0.90 0.63 -0.27*** 0.27 0.29
Ind_Concentration 36,373 8,501 0.87 0.81 -0.06*** 1.00 1.00 0.00   0.23 0.27
Ret_Vol 44,022 8,501 0.04 0.03 -0.01*** 0.03 0.03 -0.00*** 0.02 0.02
Spread 44,010 8,501 0.02 0.01 -0.01*** 0.01 0.00 -0.01*** 0.03 0.01
Turnover 44,041 8,501 0.01 0.01 0.00*** 0.00 0.01 0.01*** 0.01 0.01
Institution 36,038 8,501 0.44 0.72 0.28*** 0.40 0.75 0.35*** 0.32 0.23
FC_Error 19,851 8,501 0.73 0.63 -0.1*** 0.06 0.04 -0.02*** 2.19 2.04
Dispersion 15,288 8,501 0.05 0.04 -0.01*** 0.00 0.00 -0.00*** 0.14 0.13
N_Analyst 20,081 8,501 4.76 7.65 2.89*** 3.00 6.00 3.00*** 4.44 5.50
Board_Size 36,815 8,501 9.25 12.42 3.17*** 9.00 13.00 4.00*** 3.37 3.33
Board_Indep 36,815 8,501 0.71 0.66 -0.05*** 0.71 0.64 -0.07*** 0.14 0.12
No. of firm-years Mean Median Standard deviation
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Table 1.2: Comparing Sample Firm Characteristics in Purchase Years with Non-purchase Years  
 
Note: This table compares sample firm statistics for years during which at least one outside director in the sample has conducted one purchase. Three statistics 
are presented: the mean, the median and the standard deviation. For each statistic, the first column presents firms in the intersection between Compustat and 
CRSP, and the second column presents firms in my sample. The third column (if applicable) presents the difference between the sample firms and firms with 
Compustat and CRSP data (sample firms – Compustat & CRSP firms). ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
Assets are total assets (in millions); Sales are net sales (in millions); Market_Cap is price per share multiplied by the number of shares outstanding (in millions) 
as of the fiscal year end date; Spread is the average daily bid-ask spread scaled by price over the fiscal year; Turnover is trading volume divided by shares 









years Trade years Difference
Non-trade 
years Trade years Difference Non-trade years Trade years
Assets 6,389 2,112 8,740.16 11,244.36 2504.2*** 1,833.29 2,268.20 434.91*** 18,026.22 21,233.47
Sales 6,389 2,112 5,051.81 5,707.55 655.74*** 1,320.19 1,594.20 274.01*** 8,711.49 9,260.22
Market_Cap 6,389 2,112 6,426.91 7,307.12 880.21*** 1,685.21 1,874.10 188.89*  4,777.14 11,733.70
Leverage 6,389 2,112 0.18 0.20 0.02*** 0.15 0.16 0.01** 0.18 0.20
MTB 6,389 2,112 3.25 3.10 -0.15      2.33 2.14 -0.19**  3.94 3.94
RND 6,389 2,112 0.05 0.05 0.00     0.00 0.00 0.00** 0.10 0.11
ROA 6,389 2,112 0.00 -0.01 -0.01*** 0.04 0.03 -0.01*** 0.19 0.22
Intangibles 6,389 2,112 0.77 0.76 -0.01** 0.84 0.84 -0.00     0.21 0.23
N_Segments 6,389 2,112 2.84 2.88 0.04     3.00 3.00 0.00    1.92 1.95
Geo_Concentration 6,389 2,112 0.65 0.65 0.00     0.63 0.63 0.00    0.29 0.28
Ind_Concentration 6,389 2,112 0.82 0.81 -0.01      1.00 1.00 -0.00     0.27 0.27
Ret_Vol 6,389 2,112 0.03 0.03 0.00*** 0.03 0.03 0.00    0.02 0.02
Spread 6,389 2,112 0.01 0.00 -0.01*** 0.00 0.00 -0.00     0.01 0.01
Turnover 6,389 2,112 0.01 0.01 0.00     0.01 0.01 0.00    0.01 0.01
Institution 6,389 2,112 0.72 0.72 0.00     0.75 0.74 -0.01     0.23 0.23
FC_Error 6,389 2,112 0.59 0.74 0.15*** 0.04 0.04 0.00     1.94 2.28
Dispersion 6,389 2,112 0.04 0.04 0.00** 0.00 0.00 0.00     0.12 0.15
N_Analyst 6,389 2,112 7.55 7.92 0.37*** 6.00 6.00 0.00*** 5.48 5.54
Board_Size 6,389 2,112 12.35 12.66 0.31*** 12.00 13.00 1.00*** 3.29 3.44
Board_Indep 6,389 2,112 0.65 0.67 0.02*** 0.64 0.65 0.01*** 0.12 0.12
No. of firm-years Mean Median Standard deviation
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Table 1.3: Comparing Sample Firm Characteristics in Sale Years with Non-sale Years  
 
Note: This table compares sample firm statistics for years during which at least one outside director in the sample has conducted one sale. Three statistics are 
presented: the mean, the median and the standard deviation. For each statistic, the first column presents firms in the intersection between Compustat and CRSP, 
and the second column presents firms in my sample. The third column (if applicable) presents the difference between the sample firms and firms with Compustat 
and CRSP data (sample firms – Compustat & CRSP firms). ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Assets are total 
assets (in millions); Sales are net sales (in millions); Market_Cap is price per share multiplied by the number of shares outstanding (in millions) as of the fiscal 
year end date; Spread is the average daily bid-ask spread scaled by price over the fiscal year; Turnover is trading volume divided by shares outstanding. All 











years Trade years Difference
Non-trade 
years Trade years Difference Non-trade years Trade years
Assets 7,069 1,432 9,181.98 10,252.49 1070.51** 1,899.58 2,003.76 104.18*  17,875.49 20,504.98
Sales 7,069 1,432 5,195.53 5,309.48 113.95** 1,321.31 1,446.64 125.33** 8,720.06 8,874.27
Market_Cap 7,069 1,432 6,533.94 7,196.74 662.80** 1,573.54 1,879.52 305.98*  9,838.80 10,648.46
Leverage 7,069 1,432 0.19 0.15 -0.04*** 0.14 0.10 -0.04*** 0.19 0.18
MTB 7,069 1,432 3.14 3.55 0.41*** 2.39 2.89 0.50** 3.83 4.14
RND 7,069 1,432 0.05 0.05 0.00     0.00 0.00 0.00     0.10 0.09
ROA 7,069 1,432 -0.01 0.03 0.04*** 0.04 0.05 0.01*** 0.19 0.18
Intangibles 7,069 1,432 0.76 0.79 0.03*** 0.85 0.87 0.02**  0.22 0.22
N_Segments 7,069 1,432 2.86 2.82 -0.04     3.00 3.00 0.00     1.90 1.87
Geo_Concentration 7,069 1,432 0.65 0.66 0.01     0.62 0.65 0.03     0.29 0.28
Ind_Concentration 7,069 1,432 0.81 0.85 0.04     1.00 1.00 0.00     0.25 0.24
Ret_Vol 7,069 1,432 0.03 0.03 0.00     0.03 0.03 0.00     0.02 0.02
Spread 7,069 1,432 0.01 0.00 -0.01**   0.00 0.00 0.00     0.01 0.01
Turnover 7,069 1,432 0.01 0.01 0.00     0.01 0.01 0.00     0.01 0.01
Institution 7,069 1,432 0.72 0.74 0.02     0.75 0.75 0.00     0.24 0.22
FC_Error 7,069 1,432 0.61 0.71 0.10**  0.04 0.04 0.00     2.08 1.76
Dispersion 7,069 1,432 0.04 0.04 0.00     0.00 0.00 0.00     0.13 0.12
N_Analyst 7,069 1,432 7.55 8.10 0.55*** 6.00 7.00 1.00**  5.67 5.84
Board_Size 7,069 1,432 12.50 12.07 -0.43*** 12.00 12.00 0.00     3.29 3.37
Board_Indep 7,069 1,432 0.66 0.65 -0.01     0.64 0.64 0.00     0.12 0.12
No. of firm-years Mean Median Standard deviation
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Table 2: Outside Director Characteristics  
 
Note: This table presents descriptive statistics for the sample directors and compare them with outside directors of the same firms as the sample directors but not 
included in the sample (“peers”). The unit of observation is firm-director. Three statistics are presented: the mean, the median and the standard deviation. For each 
statistic, the first column presents characteristics of the sample directors’ peers, and the second column presents outside directors in my sample. The third column 
(if applicable) presents the difference between the sample directors and their peers (sample directors– peers). ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 
5% and 10% levels, respectively. No. of years on board is the total number of years the director has been on the firm’s board; No. of years in firm is the total 
number of years the director has been in the firm (including years not on the board); Total number of other public board positions is the total number of public 
firms that the director serves as a board member other than the current firm; Total number of committee positions on board is the number of board committees that 
the director sits on within the firm; Total number of committee chairs is the number of board committees in the firm that the director serves as the committee chair; 
Audit committee financial expert is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the director is identified by the firm as the financial expert on the audit committee and 0 
otherwise; Industry expert is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the outside director has worked in firms that are in the same industry as the current firm, and zero 
otherwise; Employment connections with the CEO is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the outside director has worked in the same firm with the CEO other than 
the current firm, and 0 otherwise; Education connections with the CEO is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the outside director has gone to the same university 
with the CEO, and 0 otherwise; Other social connections with the CEO is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the outside director joins the same club, charity or 
other social organizations with the CEO, and 0 otherwise; Age is the average age of the outside director while on the board; Gender is an indicator variable that 














No. of years on board 11,179 1,332 6.35 4.89 -1.46*** 3.89 3.40 -0.49*** 6.56 4.61
No. of years in firm 11,179 1,332 6.70 4.99 -1.71*** 3.90 3.47 -0.43*** 7.21 4.88
Total number of other public board positions 11,179 1,332 3.30 5.18 1.88*** 2.67 4.75 2.08*** 2.47 2.73
Total number of committee positions on board 11,123 1,332 1.18 1.39 0.21*** 1.00 1.36 0.36*** 0.77 0.68
Total number of committee chairs 11,123 1,332 0.25 0.36 0.11*** 0.00 0.00 0.00*** 0.39 0.42
Audit committee financial expert 11,123 1,332 0.15 0.26 0.11*** 0.00 0.00 0.00*** 0.33 0.41
Industry expert 11,180 1,332 0.08 0.12 0.04*** 0.00 0.00 0.00*** 0.27 0.32
Employment connections with the CEO 11,180 1,332 0.20 0.20 0.00     0.00 0.00 0.00     0.38 0.37
Educational connections with the CEO 11,180 1,332 0.11 0.10 -0.01      0.00 0.00 0.01     0.29 0.28
Other social connections with the CEO 11,180 1,332 0.20 0.19 -0.01      0.00 0.00 0.02     0.37 0.37
Age 11,094 1,332 59.37 60.45 1.08*** 60.00 61.00 1.00*** 8.85 7.08
Gender 11,180 1,332 0.12 0.17 0.05*** 0.00 0.00 0.00*** 0.33 0.37
No. of firm-directors Mean Median Standard deviation
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Table 3: Regression Variables 
 
Note: This table presents descriptive statistics of absolute values of the first differences of firm 
and outside director characteristics. For example, for an outside director who serves two firms A 
and B, ABS_Dif_Variable indicates the differences between Variable of firm A and firm B. See 
Appendix for variable definitions. All variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. 
Variables n Mean S.D. 0.25 Mdn 0.75
 ABS_Dif_Buy_Ret_3m 873 0.21 0.20 0.07 0.15 0.28
 ABS_Dif_Buy_Ret_6m 873 0.30 0.28 0.10 0.22 0.44
 ABS_Dif_Buy_Ret_9m 873 0.38 0.36 0.12 0.27 0.54
 ABS_Dif_Buy_Ret_12m 873 0.44 0.41 0.14 0.32 0.58
 ABS_Dif_Sell_Ret_3m 515 0.18 0.15 0.06 0.14 0.24
 ABS_Dif_Sell_Ret_6m 515 0.24 0.21 0.08 0.18 0.34
 ABS_Dif_Sell_Ret_9m 515 0.31 0.28 0.09 0.22 0.44
 ABS_Dif_Sell_Ret_12m 515 0.34 0.29 0.10 0.27 0.48
ABS_Dif_Predict_CF 873 0.07 0.10 0.01 0.04 0.08
 ABS_Dif_N_Analyst 873 5.37 4.39 2.00 4.00 8.00
ABS_Dif_Dispersion 873 0.07 0.17 0.00 0.01 0.05
ABS_Dif_FC_Error 873 0.93 2.13 0.03 0.17 0.76
 ABS_Dif_Ret_Vol 873 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02
 ABS_Dif_Inside_Buy_3m 873 0.08 0.15 0.00 0.01 0.11
 ABS_Dif_Inside_Buy_6m 873 0.12 0.19 0.00 0.02 0.16
 ABS_Dif_Inside_Buy_9m 873 0.15 0.24 0.00 0.02 0.20
 ABS_Dif_Inside_Buy_12m 873 0.18 0.29 0.00 0.02 0.23
 ABS_Dif_Inside_Sell_3m 515 0.09 0.11 0.00 0.05 0.13
 ABS_Dif_Inside_Sell_6m 515 0.14 0.16 0.00 0.09 0.22
 ABS_Dif_Inside_Sell_9m 515 0.18 0.21 0.00 0.11 0.27
 ABS_Dif_Inside_Sell_12m 515 0.19 0.23 0.00 0.11 0.30
 ABS_Dif_Restrict 873 0.32 0.47 0.00 0.00 1.00
 ABS_Dif_Transize 873 110000.00 220000.00 10788.50 34127.00 96079.30
 ABS_Dif_MTB 873 3.41 4.31 0.78 1.86 4.06
 ABS_Dif_RND 873 0.39 0.48 0.00 0.00 1.00
 ABS_Dif_Leverage 873 0.20 0.17 0.06 0.16 0.29
 ABS_Dif_Intangibles 873 0.21 0.19 0.06 0.16 0.32
 ABS_Dif_Log_N_Segments 873 0.59 0.49 0.14 0.56 0.92
 ABS_Dif_Ind_Concentration 873 0.23 0.25 0.00 0.14 0.42
 ABS_Dif_Geo_Concentration 873 0.30 0.25 0.04 0.28 0.50
 ABS_Dif_ROA 873 0.18 0.24 0.04 0.08 0.21
 ABS_Dif_Size 873 2.14 1.61 0.89 1.77 3.05
 ABS_Dif_N_People_Purchase 873 1.42 1.30 0.50 1.00 2.00
 ABS_Dif_Board_Size 873 2.86 2.15 1.00 2.50 4.00
 ABS_Dif_Board_Indep 873 0.13 0.10 0.04 0.10 0.20
 ABS_Dif_Institution 873 0.23 0.18 0.09 0.17 0.33
 ABS_Dif_Audit_Committee 873 0.34 0.45 0.00 0.00 1.00
 ABS_Dif_Nomin_Committee 873 0.42 0.47 0.00 0.00 1.00
 ABS_Dif_Compen_Committee 873 0.45 0.47 0.00 0.25 1.00
 ABS_Dif_Ind_Expert 873 0.15 0.35 0.00 0.00 0.00
 ABS_Dif_Tie 873 0.46 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00
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Table 4.1: Outside Director Purchase Characteristics 
 
Note: This table presents descriptive statistics for the purchase profitability, purchase size and purchase frequency of sample outside directors and compare them 
with outside directors of the same firms as the sample directors but not included in the sample (“peers”). The unit of observation for trading profitability and 
trading size variables is each individual trade, and the unit of observation for trading frequency variables is director-firm-year. Three statistics are presented: the 
mean, the median and the standard deviation. For each statistic, the first column presents characteristics of the sample directors’ peers, and the second column 
presents outside directors in my sample. The third column (if applicable) presents the difference between the sample directors and their peers (sample directors– 


















Buy_Ret_3m 65,768 4,718 0.03 0.05 0.02*** 0.00 0.02 0.02*** 0.25 0.25
Buy_Ret_6m 66,008 4,718 0.03 0.07 0.04*** -0.01 0.02 0.03*** 0.35 0.36
Buy_Ret_9m 66,218 4,718 0.03 0.09 0.06*** -0.03 0.02 0.05*** 0.44 0.46
Buy_Ret_12m 66,430 4,718 0.03 0.13 0.10*** -0.04 0.03 0.07*** 0.50 0.54
Buy_Raw_3m 65,768 4,718 0.05 0.07 0.02*** 0.02 0.04 0.02*** 0.28 0.29
Buy_Raw_6m 66,008 4,718 0.08 0.12 0.04*** 0.04 0.06 0.02*** 0.42 0.45
Buy_Raw_9m 66,218 4,718 0.11 0.16 0.05*** 0.05 0.08 0.03*** 0.53 0.58
Buy_Raw_12m 66,430 4,718 0.14 0.22 0.08*** 0.06 0.11 0.05*** 0.64 0.70
Tran_Size 68,987 4,925 66,822.34 90,000.00 23177.66*** 12,360.00 26,400.00 14040.00*** 210,000.00 390,000.00
Frequency 1 78,882 9,067 0.49 0.45 -0.04*** 0.00 0.00 0.00*** 1.15 1.01
Frequency 2 20,420 2,466 1.90 1.67 -0.23*** 1.00 1.00 0.00*** 1.56 1.31
No. of Obs Mean Median Standard deviation
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Table 4.2: Outside Director Sale Characteristics  
 
Note: This table presents descriptive statistics for the sale profitability, sale size and sale frequency of sample outside directors and compare them with outside 
directors of the same firms as the sample directors but not included in the sample (“peers”). The unit of observation for trading profitability and trading size 
variables is each individual trade, and the unit of observation for trading frequency variables is director-firm-year. Three statistics are presented: the mean, the 
median and the standard deviation. For each statistic, the first column presents characteristics of the sample directors’ peers, and the second column presents 
outside directors in my sample. The third column (if applicable) presents the difference between the sample directors and their peers (sample directors– peers). 















Sell_Ret_3m 68,370 4,239 0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.18 0.18
Sell_Ret_6m 68,494 4,239 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.01 -0.02* 0.26 0.26
Sell_Ret_9m 68,622 4,239 0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.04 0.02 -0.02* 0.32 0.32
Sell_Ret_12m 68,696 4,239 0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.05 0.03 -0.02* 0.36 0.36
Sell_Raw_3m 68,370 4,239 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.20 0.21
Sell_Raw_6m 68,494 4,239 -0.02 -0.02 0.00 -0.01 -0.03 -0.02 0.29 0.31
Sell_Raw_9m 68,622 4,239 -0.04 -0.05 -0.01 -0.02 -0.04 -0.02 0.37 0.39
Sell_Raw_12m 68,696 4,239 -0.06 -0.07 -0.01 -0.03 -0.05 -0.02 0.42 0.45
Tran_Size 72,007 4,469 1,100,000.00 1,900,000.00 800000.00*** 140,000.00 250,000.00 110000.00*** 4,400,000.00 6,400,000.00
Frequency 1 59,806 5,310 0.65 0.66 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00*** 1.79 1.67
Frequency 2 14,779 1,460 2.64 2.40 -0.24*** 1.00 1.00 0.00*** 2.79 2.45
No. of Obs Mean Median Standard deviation
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dependent Variables
Independent Variables
Dif_Predict_CF -0.2211** -0.2097* -0.3633** -0.3381** 0.1868 0.2182 0.1380 0.1800
(-2.04) (-1.92) (-2.22) (-2.04) (0.73) (0.85) (0.61) (0.78)
Dif_N_Analyst 0.0009 0.0008 0.0013 0.0012 0.0006 0.0004 0.0033 0.0030
(0.50) (0.49) (0.59) (0.52) (0.19) (0.12) (0.90) (0.83)
Dif_Dispersion 0.0808 0.0584 0.0363 0.0748
(1.30) (0.78) (0.31) (0.52)
Dif_FC_Error -0.0069 -0.0191*** -0.0249*** -0.0324***
(-1.40) (-3.56) (-4.10) (-3.40)
Control Variables
Dif_Ret_Vol -0.0308 -0.0706 -2.0929*** -2.1394*** -3.6609*** -3.7064*** -4.6020*** -4.6717***
(-0.05) (-0.12) (-2.70) (-2.76) (-4.14) (-4.22) (-4.94) (-5.04)
Dif_Inside_Ret 0.3415*** 0.3362*** 0.5947*** 0.5803*** 0.7007*** 0.6820*** 0.8040*** 0.7797***
(5.15) (4.96) (6.15) (5.95) (6.49) (6.30) (7.01) (6.86)
Dif_Restrict 0.0076 0.0080 0.0023 0.0057 -0.0206 -0.0156 -0.0206 -0.0145
(0.42) (0.44) (0.10) (0.27) (-0.69) (-0.53) (-0.57) (-0.41)
Dif_Tran_Size 0.0000** 0.0000** 0.0000* 0.0000 0.0000** 0.0000* 0.0000** 0.0000**
(2.55) (2.51) (1.73) (1.63) (2.03) (1.89) (2.35) (2.15)
Dif_MTB -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0043 -0.0041 -0.0024 -0.0022 -0.0002 0.0001
(-0.34) (-0.33) (-1.62) (-1.53) (-0.84) (-0.77) (-0.05) (0.03)
Dif_RND 0.0043 0.0038 0.0057 0.0058 0.0199 0.0204 0.0327 0.0332
(0.24) (0.21) (0.23) (0.23) (0.59) (0.61) (0.80) (0.82)
Dif_Leverage -0.0429 -0.0489 -0.0514 -0.0587 -0.0703 -0.0775 -0.0901 -0.1011
(-1.06) (-1.21) (-0.85) (-0.97) (-0.96) (-1.06) (-1.08) (-1.21)
Dif_Intangibles -0.0055 0.0032 -0.0342 -0.0164 -0.0642 -0.0425 -0.0766 -0.0473
(-0.14) (0.08) (-0.65) (-0.31) (-1.02) (-0.68) (-1.11) (-0.70)
Dif_Log_N_Segments 0.0193 0.0189 -0.0043 -0.0056 -0.0010 -0.0027 0.0258 0.0236
(1.19) (1.16) (-0.20) (-0.26) (-0.03) (-0.10) (0.80) (0.73)
Dif_Ind_Concentration 0.0135 0.0141 -0.0128 -0.0122 0.0096 0.0102 0.0329 0.0338
(0.39) (0.41) (-0.27) (-0.26) (0.15) (0.16) (0.49) (0.51)
Dif_Geo_Concentration 0.0118 0.0080 -0.0198 -0.0241 0.0161 0.0120 0.0337 0.0273
(0.43) (0.29) (-0.55) (-0.67) (0.34) (0.25) (0.59) (0.48)
Dif_ROA 0.0126 0.0072 -0.0280 -0.0353 -0.0418 -0.0496 -0.0984 -0.1098
(0.33) (0.18) (-0.43) (-0.54) (-0.54) (-0.64) (-1.20) (-1.37)
Dif_Size 0.0028 0.0031 -0.0067 -0.0057 -0.0110 -0.0097 -0.0162* -0.0145
(0.57) (0.63) (-1.06) (-0.91) (-1.41) (-1.25) (-1.72) (-1.57)
Dif_N_People_Purchase -0.0025 -0.0013 -0.0052 -0.0026 -0.0042 -0.0010 -0.0055 -0.0011
(-0.52) (-0.27) (-0.73) (-0.36) (-0.44) (-0.10) (-0.50) (-0.10)
Dif_Buy_Ret_3m Dif_Buy_Ret_6m Dif_Buy_Ret_9m Dif_Buy_Ret_12m
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Table 5.1: Outside Director Purchase Profitability and Public Information Transparency (Cont.) 
 
Note: This table presents the regression that tests the relation between an outside director’s relative purchase profitability across 
the different firms she serves and the relative transparency of public information of those firms. The research design and 
construction of variables are described in Chapter 3 and Appendix. All variables are defined in Appendix . If an outside director 
sits on more than two boards, the differences of the variables are taken across each pair of firms. Thus, for an outside director 
who serves on N boards, the number of observations for that director is N(N-1)/2. ***, ** and * indicates statistical significance 












Dif_Board_Size 0.0028 0.0023 -0.0001 -0.0009 -0.0048 -0.0056 -0.0056 -0.0068
(0.85) (0.71) (-0.03) (-0.20) (-0.83) (-1.02) (-0.85) (-1.08)
Dif_Board_Indep -0.1605** -0.1479* -0.1519 -0.1261 -0.3102** -0.2787* -0.2677* -0.2251
(-2.09) (-1.93) (-1.44) (-1.20) (-2.17) (-1.96) (-1.66) (-1.40)
Dif_Institution -0.0739* -0.0671 -0.0522 -0.0442 -0.0492 -0.0412 -0.0438 -0.0317
(-1.73) (-1.59) (-0.87) (-0.75) (-0.65) (-0.55) (-0.52) (-0.38)
Dif_Audit_Committee -0.0033 -0.0038 -0.0138 -0.0134 -0.0116 -0.0106 -0.0189 -0.0178
(-0.18) (-0.20) (-0.51) (-0.50) (-0.32) (-0.29) (-0.47) (-0.45)
Dif_Nomin_Comittee -0.0180 -0.0188 -0.0119 -0.0144 0.0039 0.0007 -0.0074 -0.0116
(-1.09) (-1.14) (-0.47) (-0.56) (0.12) (0.02) (-0.20) (-0.32)
Dif_Compen_Committee 0.0234 0.0213 0.0449* 0.0413* 0.0394 0.0352 0.0330 0.0271
(1.33) (1.21) (1.91) (1.76) (1.29) (1.17) (0.90) (0.76)
Dif_Ind_Expert 0.0489* 0.0501* 0.0546 0.0541 0.0269 0.0254 0.0691 0.0678
(1.76) (1.80) (1.22) (1.21) (0.50) (0.48) (1.28) (1.28)
Dif_Tie 0.0028 0.0004 0.0219 0.0180 0.0121 0.0077 0.0166 0.0104
(0.19) (0.03) (1.01) (0.83) (0.46) (0.29) (0.56) (0.36)
Constant 0.0026 0.0021 -0.0057 -0.0058 -0.0155 -0.0154 -0.0105 -0.0105
(0.21) (0.17) (-0.33) (-0.34) (-0.71) (-0.71) (-0.43) (-0.44)
Observations 873 873 873 873 873 873 873 873
R-squared 0.11 0.12 0.15 0.16 0.15 0.16 0.15 0.16
Cluster by director Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dependent Variables
Independent Variables
Dif_Predict_CF -0.0801 -0.0787 -0.0918 -0.0937 0.0447 0.0396 0.0491 0.0455
(-1.00) (-0.97) (-0.82) (-0.84) (0.33) (0.29) (0.26) (0.24)
Dif_N_Analyst -0.0001 -0.0000 -0.0019 -0.0018 -0.0035 -0.0034 -0.0015 -0.0012
(-0.09) (-0.02) (-1.00) (-0.95) (-1.44) (-1.39) (-0.54) (-0.44)
Dif_Dispersion 0.1008 0.0977 0.1090 0.2332
(0.89) (0.71) (0.75) (1.37)
Dif_FC_Error 0.0027 0.0057 0.0092 0.0127
(0.28) (0.48) (0.68) (0.82)
Control Variables
Dif_Ret_Vol 0.2075 0.2290 0.0915 0.1121 0.2774 0.3003 -0.2472 -0.1979
(0.36) (0.40) (0.14) (0.17) (0.32) (0.35) (-0.23) (-0.18)
Dif_Inside_Ret 0.3725*** 0.3697*** 0.5831*** 0.5807*** 0.8886*** 0.8864*** 0.8090*** 0.8033***
(5.07) (5.00) (6.82) (6.81) (9.24) (9.26) (7.47) (7.40)
Dif_Restrict 0.0375* 0.0358* 0.0371 0.0358 0.0484 0.0472 0.0489 0.0455
(1.88) (1.81) (1.42) (1.38) (1.49) (1.45) (1.27) (1.19)
Dif_Tran_Size 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000** 0.0000**
(0.01) (-0.03) (0.65) (0.62) (0.43) (0.40) (2.23) (2.17)
Dif_MTB 0.0009 0.0011 0.0068* 0.0069** 0.0078* 0.0080* 0.0053 0.0057
(0.43) (0.54) (1.96) (2.00) (1.65) (1.68) (1.14) (1.23)
Dif_RND 0.0075 0.0076 -0.0103 -0.0104 -0.0032 -0.0034 -0.0037 -0.0038
(0.40) (0.40) (-0.40) (-0.41) (-0.10) (-0.11) (-0.10) (-0.10)
Dif_Leverage -0.0300 -0.0307 -0.0125 -0.0138 0.0105 0.0085 0.0130 0.0102
(-0.67) (-0.69) (-0.20) (-0.22) (0.15) (0.12) (0.17) (0.13)
Dif_Intangibles -0.0290 -0.0316 -0.0127 -0.0165 0.0211 0.0155 0.0351 0.0263
(-0.83) (-0.90) (-0.26) (-0.34) (0.34) (0.25) (0.48) (0.36)
Dif_Log_N_Segments -0.0145 -0.0145 -0.0048 -0.0044 -0.0260 -0.0252 -0.0324 -0.0317
(-0.91) (-0.92) (-0.21) (-0.19) (-0.96) (-0.93) (-1.08) (-1.05)
Dif_Ind_Concentration -0.0369 -0.0422 -0.0447 -0.0479 -0.1017 -0.1033 -0.1322* -0.1403*
(-0.87) (-1.00) (-0.80) (-0.84) (-1.54) (-1.58) (-1.71) (-1.80)
Dif_Geo_Concentration 0.0179 0.0174 0.0471 0.0460 0.1168** 0.1150** 0.1023* 0.0998*
(0.62) (0.60) (1.32) (1.28) (2.57) (2.52) (1.96) (1.91)
Dif_ROA 0.1555*** 0.1513** 0.1875*** 0.1821*** 0.2775*** 0.2704*** 0.3433*** 0.3309***
(2.66) (2.58) (2.89) (2.83) (3.29) (3.23) (2.93) (2.82)
Dif_Size 0.0013 0.0019 -0.0014 -0.0007 -0.0062 -0.0055 -0.0101 -0.0086
(0.21) (0.31) (-0.17) (-0.09) (-0.60) (-0.52) (-0.89) (-0.76)
Dif_N_People_Sale 0.0110 0.0115 0.0324*** 0.0325*** 0.0382** 0.0380** 0.0359** 0.0362**




Table 5.2: Outside Director Sale Profitability and Public Information Transparency (Cont.) 
 
Note: This table presents the regression that tests the relation between an outside director’s relative sale profitability across the 
different firms she serves and the relative transparency of public information of those firms. The research design and 
construction of variables are described in Chapter 3 and Appendix. All variables are defined in Appendix. If an outside 
director sits on more than two boards, the differences of the variables are taken across each pair of firms. Thus, for an outside 
director who serves on N boards, the number of observations for that director is N(N-1)/2. ***, ** and * indicates statistical 




















Dif_Board_Size -0.0052 -0.0054 0.0000 -0.0001 0.0009 0.0009 0.0033 0.0031
(-1.45) (-1.51) (0.00) (-0.01) (0.15) (0.16) (0.55) (0.51)
Dif_Board_Indep -0.1048 -0.1012 0.0531 0.0556 0.0608 0.0629 0.0748 0.0812
(-1.57) (-1.53) (0.62) (0.65) (0.60) (0.62) (0.60) (0.65)
Dif_Institution -0.0166 -0.0178 -0.0236 -0.0244 -0.0252 -0.0257 -0.0760 -0.0780
(-0.45) (-0.48) (-0.42) (-0.44) (-0.37) (-0.37) (-0.95) (-0.98)
Dif_Audit_Committee 0.0394** 0.0410** 0.0606** 0.0616** 0.0622** 0.0629** 0.0640** 0.0667**
(2.10) (2.18) (2.43) (2.48) (2.28) (2.31) (2.09) (2.20)
Dif_Nomin_Comittee 0.0066 0.0078 0.0241 0.0256 0.0389 0.0409 0.0264 0.0298
(0.40) (0.47) (1.07) (1.12) (1.42) (1.47) (0.92) (1.03)
Dif_Compen_Committee -0.0306* -0.0305* -0.0263 -0.0262 -0.0239 -0.0237 -0.0228 -0.0225
(-1.85) (-1.85) (-1.13) (-1.12) (-0.83) (-0.82) (-0.70) (-0.70)
Dif_Ind_Expert -0.0126 -0.0110 0.0044 0.0059 -0.0108 -0.0094 0.0302 0.0336
(-0.44) (-0.39) (0.11) (0.15) (-0.20) (-0.17) (0.45) (0.50)
Dif_Tie 0.0030 0.0029 -0.0165 -0.0166 -0.0260 -0.0260 -0.0310 -0.0311
(0.18) (0.18) (-0.82) (-0.82) (-1.11) (-1.11) (-1.11) (-1.11)
Constant -0.0058 -0.0053 -0.0106 -0.0102 0.0108 0.0112 0.0032 0.0043
(-0.53) (-0.49) (-0.77) (-0.73) (0.62) (0.64) (0.17) (0.23)
Observations 515 515 515 515 515 515 515 515
R-squared 0.20 0.20 0.27 0.27 0.33 0.33 0.26 0.26
Cluster by director Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 6.1: Outside Director Three-month Purchase Profitability and Public Information 




Table 6.2: Outside Director Six-month Purchase Profitability and Public Information 









(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable
Dif_Predict_CF 0.0601 0.1046 -0.1827 -0.1771
(0.28) (0.48) (-1.41) (-1.36)
Dif_N_Analyst -0.0012 -0.0013 0.0009 0.0010





Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster by director Yes Yes Yes Yes
Dif_Buy_Ret_3m Dif_Buy_Ret_3m
High difference in litigation risk Low difference in litigation risk
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable
Dif_Predict_CF 0.0410 0.1340 -0.3461** -0.3281**
(0.15) (0.50) (-2.36) (-2.21)
Dif_N_Analyst -0.0026 -0.0030 0.0043 0.0044





Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster by director Yes Yes Yes Yes
Dif_Buy_Ret_6m Dif_Buy_Ret_6m
High difference in litigation risk Low difference in litigation risk
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Table 6.3: Outside Director Nine-month Purchase Profitability and Public Information 
Transparency: Partition by Litigation Risk 
 
 
Table 6.4: Outside Director Twelve-month Purchase Profitability and Public Information 










(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable
Dif_Predict_CF 0.5196 0.5805 -0.2225 -0.1814
(1.26) (1.37) (-1.25) (-1.00)
Dif_N_Analyst -0.0022 -0.0026 0.0020 0.0022





Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster by director Yes Yes Yes Yes
High difference in litigation risk Low difference in litigation risk
Dif_Buy_Ret_9m Dif_Buy_Ret_9m
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable
Dif_Predict_CF 0.7028 0.7745 -0.2966 -0.2351
(1.53) (1.64) (-1.45) (-1.15)
Dif_N_Analyst -0.0014 -0.0017 0.0023 0.0027





Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster by director Yes Yes Yes Yes
Dif_Buy_Ret_12m Dif_Buy_Ret_12m
High difference in litigation risk Low difference in litigation risk
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Table 6.5: Outside Director Three-month Sale Profitability and Public Information Transparency: 




Table 6.6: Outside Director Six-month Sale Profitability and Public Information Transparency: 











(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable
Dif_Predict_CF -0.2723** -0.2747** 0.0967 0.1176
(-2.12) (-2.15) (0.71) (0.86)
Dif_N_Analyst 0.0035 0.0036 -0.0015 -0.0017





Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster by director Yes Yes Yes Yes
Dif_Sell_Ret_3m Dif_Sell_Ret_3m
High difference in litigation risk Low difference in litigation risk
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable
Dif_Predict_CF -0.2005 -0.1963 0.0924 0.0714
(-0.88) (-0.87) (0.48) (0.38)
Dif_N_Analyst 0.0029 0.0027 -0.0026 -0.0024





Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster by director Yes Yes Yes Yes
Dif_Sell_Ret_6m Dif_Sell_Ret_6m
High difference in litigation risk Low difference in litigation risk
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Table 6.7: Outside Director Nine-month Sale Profitability and Public Information Transparency: 
Partition by Litigation Risk 
 
 
Table 6.8: Outside Director Twelve-month Sale Profitability and Public Information Transparency: 
Partition by Litigation Risk 
 
Note: Tables 6.1 through 6.8 present the differential effect of public information transparency on an outside 
director’s trading profitability for firm-pairs that exhibit high vs. low absolute difference in litigation risk. Tables 
6.1 through 6.4 examine outside director purchase profitability. Tables 6.5 through 6.8 examine outside director 
sales profitability. The difference in litigation risk is measured as an index that ranks the absolute differences 
between each firm-pair in stock return volatility, stock return skewness, sales growth, stock turnover and absolute 
market adjusted returns (Kim and Skinner, 2011). The coefficients in bold indicate that the differences between 
firm-pairs with high vs. low differences in litigation risk are statistically significant at the 10% level at least. See 
Appendix for more detailed variable definitions. The control variables are the same as in Table 5 and are omitted for 
parsimony. ***, ** and * indicates statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. All variables are 
winsorized at 1% and 99% and standard errors are clustered by director.  
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable
Dif_Predict_CF 0.0192 0.0166 0.0062 -0.0112
(0.07) (0.06) (0.03) (-0.05)
Dif_N_Analyst 0.0001 0.0003 -0.0049 -0.0043





Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster by director Yes Yes Yes Yes
Dif_Sell_Ret_9m Dif_Sell_Ret_9m
High difference in litigation risk Low difference in litigation risk
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable
Dif_Predict_CF 0.1264 0.1143 -0.0708 -0.0643
(0.47) (0.42) (-0.28) (-0.26)
Dif_N_Analyst 0.0021 0.0028 -0.0026 -0.0019





Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster by director Yes Yes Yes Yes
Dif_Sell_Ret_12m Dif_Sell_Ret_12m
High difference in litigation risk Low difference in litigation risk
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Table 7.1: Public Information Transparency and the Number of Board Committee Positions 
 
Note: This table presents the interaction effect of number of board committee positions and public information 
transparency on outside director trading profitability. Committee equals 1, 2, and 3 respectively for an outside 
director who sits on one, two and all three of audit, compensation and nomination committees. Thus, Dif_Committee 
is the difference in Committee between the two firms that the outside director serves. The control variables are the 
same as in Table 6 and are omitted for parsimony. ***, ** and * indicates statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 


















(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variables
Dif_Predict_CF -0.0727 -0.0400 0.3308 0.3804
(-0.50) (-0.27) (1.38) (1.58)
Dif_N_Analyst 0.0015 0.0015 0.0017 0.0019





Dif_Predict_CF*Dif_Committee -0.2434 -0.4154 -0.2621 -0.6411
(-0.75) (-1.18) (-0.53) (-1.19)
Dif_N_Analyst*Dif_Committee -0.0039 -0.0042 -0.0077 -0.0085*





Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes




Table 7.2: Public Information Transparency and Audit and Compensation Committee Positions 
 
Note: This table presents the interaction effect of number of board committee positions and public information 
transparency on outside director trading profitability. Committee equals 1 or 2 respectively for an outside director 
who sits on one or two of the audit committee and compensation committee. Thus, Dif_Committee is the difference 
in Committee between the two firms that the outside director serves. The control variables are the same as in Table 6 
and are omitted for parsimony. ***, ** and * indicates statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 


















(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variables
Dif_Predict_CF -0.0909 -0.0535 0.3112 0.3727
(-0.64) (-0.37) (1.34) (1.52)
Dif_N_Analyst 0.0013 0.0013 0.0020 0.0022





Dif_Predict_CF*Dif_Committee -0.0505 -0.0838 0.3362 0.2258
(-0.14) (-0.22) (0.55) (0.34)
Dif_N_Analyst*Dif_Committee -0.0068* -0.0064* -0.0129** -0.0124*





Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes




Table 7.3: Public Information Transparency and Social Connections with the CEO 
 
Note: This table presents the interaction effect of social connections with the CEO and public 
information transparency on outside director trading profitability. An outside director is defined as 
having: i) employment ties with the CEO if they were both previously employed by the same firm 
other than the current firm; ii) educational ties with the CEO if they received education from the same 
university; iii) social ties with the CEO if they are connected via other social activities such as clubs 
and/or charities. For each director-firm, Tie is an indicator variable that equals one if the outside 
director has connections with the CEO through one of the three types of social connections. Dif_Tie is 
the difference in Tie between the two firms that the same outside director serves. The control variables 
are the same as in Table 6 and are omitted for parsimony. ***, ** and * indicates statistical 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. All variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% and 













(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variables
Dif_Predict_CF -0.0925 -0.0409 0.2939 0.3742
(-0.62) (-0.27) (1.24) (1.55)
Dif_N_Analyst 0.0020 0.0017 0.0022 0.0020





Dif_Predict_CF*Dif_Tie 0.4648** 0.5203** 0.9169*** 0.9125***
(1.99) (2.25) (2.93) (2.87)
Dif_N_Analyst*Dif_Tie -0.0038 -0.0040 0.0004 -0.0003





Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes




Table 8.1: Public Information and Outside Director Purchase Profitability: Six-month Horizon 
 
 
Table 8.2: Public Information and Outside Director Purchase Profitability: Twleve-month Horizon 
 
Note: Tables 8.1 and 8.2 present the differential effect of public information transparency on an outside 
director’s trading profitability for firms that are more vs. less affected by the macro economy using a 
fully interacted model. Table 8.1 (8.2) reports the results using six (twelve)-month size-adjusted returns 
as the dependent variable. Specifically, for each firm-year in the sample, I compute the R2s from 
regressions over the prior 12 quarters of a firm’s earnings on GDP, energy prices and interest rate 
spreads, following Hutton, Lee and Shu (2012). I then average the three R2s for each quarter. Cyclicality 
for each firm-year is the average of the quarterly measures during the year. I define high (low) cyclicality 
as firm-years which the averaged R2 is above (below) the median (the median is 50.4%).  Each 
independent variable is interacted with an indicator variable that equals one for high cyclicality and zero 
otherwise. The control variables are the same as in Table 5 and omitted for parsimony. The coefficients 
in bold indicate that the difference between high cyclicality firms and low cyclicality firms are 
statistically significant at the 10% level at least. ***, ** and * indicates statistical significance at 1%, 5% 
and 10% levels, respectively. All variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% and standard errors are 
clustered by director.  
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable
Dif_Predict_CF -0.5907*** -0.5497*** -0.2270 -0.2139
(-3.20) (-3.09) (-0.98) (-0.95)
Dif_N_Analyst 0.0045 0.0051 -0.0043 -0.0042





Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster by director Yes Yes Yes Yes
Dif_Buy_Ret_6m Dif_Buy_Ret_6m
High Cyclicality Low Cyclicality
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable
Dif_Predict_CF -0.7065** -0.7219** -0.0666 -0.0430
(-2.19) (-2.23) (-0.25) (-0.15)
Dif_N_Analyst 0.0081 0.0075 -0.0055 -0.0053





Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster by director Yes Yes Yes Yes




Table 9.1: Public Information Transparency and Outside Director Purchase Profitability: 
Controlling for Earnings Predictability 
 
Note: This table presents the regression that tests the relation between an outside director’s relative trading 
profitability across the different firms she serves and the relative transparency of public information of those firms. 
The model specification is the same as that in Table 5.1, except that the differential level of earnings predictability 
(Dif_Predictability) is controlled for. Predictability is the absolute value of the fitted residual from a firm specific 
eight-year rolling regression of one-year ahead future earnings on current earnings. ***, ** and * indicates statistical 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. All variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% and standard 
errors are clustered by director.   
 
Table 9.2: Public Information Transparency and Outside Director Purchase Profitability: 
Removing the Effect of Firm Fundamentals 
 
Note: This table presents the regression that tests the relation between an outside director’s relative trading 
profitability across the different firms she serves and the relative transparency of public information of those firms. 
The model specification is the same as that in Table 5.1, except that the financial statement transparency measure 
Predict_CF_NoFund is the fitted residual from a regression by year and industry of Predict_CF on the standard 
deviation of cash flows over the past five years, the standard deviation of sales over the past five years, the operating 
cycle and size (see Appendix for details). ***, ** and * indicates statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively. All variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% and standard errors are clustered by director.   
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES
Dif_Predict_CF -0.1973 -0.1951 -0.1902 -0.1840 0.2904 0.2997 0.4040 0.4162
(-1.27) (-1.24) (-0.77) (-0.74) (1.10) (1.12) (1.36) (1.38)
Dif_N_Analyst 0.0022 0.0023 0.0048* 0.0048* 0.0048 0.0049 0.0070 0.0072*
(1.13) (1.15) (1.79) (1.84) (1.28) (1.32) (1.64) (1.68)
Dif_Dispersion -0.0349 -0.0313 -0.0223 -0.0200
(-0.52) (-0.34) (-0.14) (-0.11)
Dif_FC_Error -0.0080 -0.0170** -0.0232*** -0.0299***
(-1.16) (-2.23) (-2.82) (-2.98)
Dif_Predictability 0.1864 0.1963 0.3858 0.4302 0.2914 0.3630 0.0342 0.1314
(0.72) (0.77) (1.04) (1.19) (0.70) (0.89) (0.08) (0.33)
Observations 553 553 553 553 553 553 553 553
R-squared 0.08 0.08 0.14 0.14 0.16 0.17 0.18 0.20
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster by director Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Dif_Buy_Ret_3m Dif_Buy_Ret_6m Dif_Buy_Ret_9m Dif_Buy_Ret_12m
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES
Dif_Predict_CF_NoFund 0.2924 0.4262 -0.2072 -0.0022 0.5725 0.8209 1.6502** 1.9166***
(0.68) (0.98) (-0.33) (-0.00) (0.81) (1.15) (2.41) (2.73)
Dif_N_Analyst -0.0013 -0.0010 -0.0024 -0.0019 -0.0058 -0.0051 -0.0033 -0.0025
(-0.54) (-0.40) (-0.71) (-0.55) (-1.28) (-1.14) (-0.69) (-0.54)
Dif_Dispersion -0.0987 -0.1103 -0.1292 -0.1186
(-1.37) (-1.14) (-0.67) (-0.52)
Dif_FC_Error -0.0193*** -0.0278*** -0.0335*** -0.0351***
(-4.26) (-4.79) (-4.48) (-3.72)
Observations 351 351 351 351 351 351 351 351
R-squared 0.08 0.11 0.19 0.22 0.20 0.23 0.21 0.23
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster by director Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Dif_Buy_Ret_3m Dif_Buy_Ret_6m Dif_Buy_Ret_9m Dif_Buy_Ret_12m
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Table 10: Public Information Transparency and Outside Director Purchase Profitability: 
Controlling for Liquidity 
 
Note: This table presents the regression that tests the relation between an outside director’s relative trading 
profitability across the different firms she serves and the relative transparency of public information of those firms. 
The model specification is the same as that in Table 5.1, except that the differential level of stock liquidity 
(Dif_Liquid) is controlled for. Liquid is the empirical measure of stock liquidity from Amihud (2002), computed as 
the ratio of daily stock returns over the daily dollar volume, then averaged across the year and multiplied by 
negative one. ***, ** and * indicates statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. All variables 
are winsorized at 1% and 99% and standard errors are clustered by director.   
 
 
Table 11: Public Information Transparency and Future Stock Returns 
 
 
Note: This table presents the differences in six-month (Ret_6m) and one-year (Ret_12m) ahead size-adjusted stock 














(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES
Dif_Predict_CF -0.2007* -0.1869* -0.3522** -0.3232* 0.1884 0.2238 0.1335 0.1829
(-1.83) (-1.69) (-2.09) (-1.90) (0.72) (0.85) (0.57) (0.78)
Dif_N_Analyst 0.0008 0.0008 0.0014 0.0013 0.0007 0.0005 0.0033 0.0030
(0.46) (0.44) (0.61) (0.55) (0.22) (0.16) (0.87) (0.80)
Dif_Dispersion 0.0664 0.0547 0.0360 0.0950
(1.11) (0.70) (0.29) (0.62)
Dif_FC_Error -0.0073 -0.0191*** -0.0247*** -0.0323***
(-1.49) (-3.56) (-4.02) (-3.40)
Dif_Liquid 0.0038 0.0036 -0.0080 -0.0071 -0.0134 -0.0118 -0.0049 -0.0033
(0.38) (0.36) (-1.16) (-0.97) (-0.72) (-0.61) (-0.25) (-0.17)
Observations 862 862 862 862 862 862 862 862
R-squared 0.11 0.11 0.15 0.16 0.15 0.16 0.15 0.16
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster by director Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Dif_Buy_Ret_3m Dif_Buy_Ret_6m Dif_Buy_Ret_9m Dif_Buy_Ret_12m
Predict_CF N_Analyst Dispersion FC_Error Predict_CF N_Analyst Dispersion FC_Error
Below the median 0.019 0.026 0.029 0.018 0.045 0.094 0.108 0.088
Above the meidan 0.026 0.013 0.010 0.022 0.048 0.095 0.082 0.103
Difference Above-Below 0.007 -0.013 -0.019 0.004 0.003 0.001 -0.026 0.015





Table 12.1: Firm Level Analysis for Pure Insiders 
 
Note: This table presents firm-level regression of pure insider purchase returns on public information transparency 
variables. The research design and variable construction are described in Chapter 4 and Appendix. ***, ** and * 
indicates statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
 
Table 12.2: Firm Level Analysis for Outside Directors 
 
Note: This table presents firm-level regression of outside director purchase returns on public information 
transparency variables. The research design and variable construction are described in Chapter 4 and Appendix. ***, 












(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dependent Variables
Predict_CF 0.0989** 0.0931* 0.1041 0.0965 0.0328 0.0216 0.0568 0.0448
(2.05) (1.94) (1.58) (1.47) (0.39) (0.26) (0.58) (0.46)
N_Analyst -0.0024*** -0.0026*** -0.0038*** -0.0040*** -0.0046*** -0.0049*** -0.0048*** -0.0052***
(-2.77) (-2.95) (-3.19) (-3.33) (-2.99) (-3.20) (-2.69) (-2.94)
Dispersion 0.0533* 0.0816** 0.1002* 0.0782
(1.79) (2.01) (1.92) (1.30)
FC_Error -0.006 -0.0071 -0.0115 -0.0144
(-2.85) (-2.47) (-3.14) (-3.41)
Observations 921 921 921 921 921 921 921 921
R-squared 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.07
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Buy_Ret_3m Buy_Ret_6m Buy_Ret_9m Buy_Ret_12m
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dependent Variables
Predict_CF 0.0318 0.0281 -0.2078** -0.2130** -0.0132 -0.0183 -0.1306 -0.1376
(0.44) (0.39) (-2.16) (-2.21) (-0.10) (-0.14) (-0.85) (-0.90)
N_Analyst 0.0010 0.0008 0.0028 0.0026 0.0025 0.0021 0.0024 0.0019
(0.72) (0.64) (1.60) (1.47) (1.07) (0.90) (0.86) (0.69)
Dispersion 0.0170 -0.0108 -0.1210 -0.1135
(0.39) (-0.18) (-1.54) (-1.21)
FC_Error -0.0051 -0.0085* -0.0121** -0.0148**
(-1.50) (-1.88) (-2.01) (-2.07)
Observations 921 921 921 921 921 921 921 921
R-squared 0.09 0.09 0.16 0.16 0.15 0.15 0.13 0.13
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Buy_Ret_3m Buy_Ret_6m Buy_Ret_9m Buy_Ret_12m
73 
 
Table 13.1: Alternative Measures of Financial Statement Transparency: Earnings-Returns 
Association 
 
Note: This table presents the regression that tests the relation between an outside director’s relative trading 
profitability across the different firms she serves and the relative transparency of public information of those firms. 
The model specification is the same as that in Table 5.1, except that the financial statement transparency measure 
Value_Relevance is the R2 from an eight-year rolling regression of stock price three months after the fiscal year end 
on earnings and book value of equity. ***, ** and * indicates statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively. All variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% and standard errors are clustered by director.   
 
 
Table 13.2: Alternative Measures of Financial Statement Transparency: Accrual Quality 
 
Note: This table presents the regression that tests the relation between an outside director’s relative trading 
profitability across the different firms she serves and the relative transparency of public information of those firms. 
The model specification is the same as that in Table 5.1, except that the financial statement transparency measure 
DD is the accrual quality from Dechow and Dichev (2002) as modified by McNichols (2002). See Appendix for 
details. ***, ** and * indicates statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. All variables are 






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES
Dif_Value_Relevance 0.0275 0.0233 0.0588* 0.0501 0.0394 0.0267 0.0600 0.0453
(1.22) (1.04) (1.94) (1.63) (0.99) (0.68) (1.18) (0.91)
Dif_N_Analyst 0.0015 0.0016 0.0041* 0.0042* 0.0039 0.0040 0.0066* 0.0066*
(0.94) (1.01) (1.81) (1.88) (1.16) (1.21) (1.72) (1.76)
Dif_Dispersion 0.0620 0.0604 0.0691 0.0375
(1.06) (0.84) (0.64) (0.28)
Dif_FC_Error -0.0103*** -0.0231*** -0.0344*** -0.0409***
(-2.92) (-4.59) (-5.66) (-5.58)
Observations 873 873 873 873 873 873 873 873
R-squared 0.11 0.12 0.15 0.16 0.15 0.16 0.15 0.16
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster by director Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Dif_Buy_Ret_3m Dif_Buy_Ret_6m Dif_Buy_Ret_9m Dif_Buy_Ret_12m
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES
Dif_DD 0.7308* 0.7608** 0.3945 0.3812 -0.2919 -0.3002 -0.4964 -0.4712
(1.87) (2.01) (0.62) (0.62) (-0.41) (-0.44) (-0.68) (-0.66)
Dif_N_Analyst 0.0008 0.0009 0.0013 0.0017 -0.0006 -0.0002 0.0010 0.0013
(0.40) (0.46) (0.42) (0.55) (-0.17) (-0.05) (0.23) (0.31)
Dif_Dispersion -0.0835 0.0007 -0.0172 -0.0917
(-1.10) (0.01) (-0.12) (-0.55)
Dif_FC_Error -0.0126** -0.0197** -0.0245*** -0.0257***
(-2.41) (-2.52) (-3.11) (-2.79)
Observations 468 468 468 468 468 468 468 468
R-squared 0.09 0.10 0.13 0.14 0.15 0.17 0.15 0.17
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster by director Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Dif_Buy_Ret_3m Dif_Buy_Ret_6m Dif_Buy_Ret_9m Dif_Buy_Ret_12m
74 
 
Table 14: Alternative Measures of Analyst Information Quality: Overall Uncertainty and Common 
Uncertainty 
 
Note: This table presents the regression that tests the relation between an outside director’s relative trading 
profitability across the different firms she serves and the relative transparency of public information of those firms. 
The model specification is the same as that in Table 5.1, except that the analyst information quality measures, 
Overall_Uncertainty and Common_Uncertainty are computed following Barron et al. (1998). See Appendix for 
details. ***, ** and * indicates statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. All variables are 



























(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES
Dif_Predict_CF -0.2112* -0.2094* -0.3408** -0.3376** 0.2156 0.2185 0.1761 0.1806
(-1.94) (-1.92) (-2.06) (-2.04) (0.84) (0.85) (0.77) (0.79)
Dif_N_Analyst 0.0008 0.0008 0.0012 0.0012 0.0004 0.0004 0.0031 0.0030
(0.50) (0.49) (0.53) (0.52) (0.13) (0.12) (0.84) (0.83)
Dif_Overall_Uncertainty -0.0055 -0.0164*** -0.0222*** -0.0285***
(-1.22) (-3.16) (-3.85) (-3.05)
Dif_Common_Uncertainty -0.0073 -0.0198*** -0.0256*** -0.0336***
(-1.45) (-3.66) (-4.12) (-3.50)
Observations 873 873 873 873 873 873 873 873
R-squared 0.11 0.12 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster by director Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Dif_Buy_Ret_3m Dif_Buy_Ret_6m Dif_Buy_Ret_9m Dif_Buy_Ret_12m
75 
 
Table 15: Fama-French Four Factor Returns 
 
Note: This table presents the regression that tests the relation between an outside director’s relative trading 
profitability across the different firms she serves and the relative transparency of public information of those firms. 
The model specification is the same as that in Table 5.1, except that the dependent variables, Dif_Buy_FFRet_6m1 
and Dif_Buy_FFREt_6m2 are six-month abnormal returns estimated using Fama French Four Factor model. See 
Appendix for details. ***, ** and * indicates statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. All 






















(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES
Dif_Predict_CF -0.1748 -0.1335 0.0465 0.1368
(-0.91) (-0.67) (0.19) (0.54)
Dif_N_Analyst 0.0015 0.0013 0.0025 0.0023





Observations 586 586 550 550
R-squared 0.15 0.16 0.12 0.14
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes




Appendix: Variable Definition 
Dependent Variables: 
Buy/Sell_Ret_3/6/9/12m Average three/six/nine/twelve-month buy-and-hold size-
adjusted returns of the firm’s stock starting from the date the 
outside director makes the purchase/sale (the purchases/sales 
made on the same date are considered one trade) during the 
fiscal year. Sales returns are multiplied by -1. 
Buy/Sell_Raw_3/6/9/12m Average three/six/nine/twelve-month buy-and-hold returns of 
the firm’s stock starting from the date the outside director 
makes the purchase/sale (the purchases/sales made on the 
same date are considered one trade) during the fiscal year. 
Sales returns are multiplied by -1. 
Buy_FF_Ret_6m1 Abnormal returns estimated using the Fama-French Four 
Factor model (Fama and French, 1993). Estimation period is 
365 days prior to the trading year. 
 
Buy_FF_Ret_6m2 Abnormal returns estimated using the Fama-French Four 
Factor model (Fama and French, 1993). Estimation period is 
730 days prior to the trading year. 
 
  
Public Information Transparency Variables: 
Predict_CF Absolute value of the fitted error term from regressing one 
year ahead cash flows (net cash flow from operating activities 
less the accrual portion of extraordinary items and 
discontinued operations) on changes in accounts receivable, 
inventory and accounts payable, and amortization and 
depreciation expense and other accrual components of 











Appendix: Variable Definition (Cont.) 
Predict_CF_NoFund Absolute value of the fitted error term from regressing 
Predict_CF on standard deviation of operating cash flows 
over the past five years, standard deviation of sales over the 
past five years, operating cycle (computed as 
log{360/[(current receivables + last year's 
receivables)/2]+360/[(current total inventory+last year's total 
inventory)/2]}, and size (log of total assets). The regression is 
conducted by year and industry (two-digit SIC codes). 
Common_Uncertainty Analyst common uncertainty, computed following Barron et 
al. (1998): Se-Disp/N_Analysts, where N_Analysts is the 
number of analysts, Disp is the forecast dispersion (variance 
of the individual analyst forecasts scaled by the absolute 
value of the actual earnings); Se is the square of forecast error 
scaled by the absolute value of actual earnings. The measure 
is computed as of each fiscal quarter and averaged across the 
four quarters each year. Forecasts older than 90 days are 
excluded. 
  
Control Variables:   
Ret_Vol Standard deviation of daily stock returns over the fiscal year. 
Inside_Buy/Sell_3/6/9/12m Average three/six/nine/twelve-month buy-and-hold size-
adjusted open market purchase/sales returns of inside 
directors during the fiscal years which the outside director has 
made her purchases. Sales returns are multiplied by -1. 
 
Dispersion Analyst forecast dispersion, computed as the variance of the 
individual analyst forecasts scaled by the absolute value of 
actual earnings. The measure is computed for forecasts 
outstanding as of the 30th day subsequent to prior year's 
earnings announcement. Forecasts older than 90 days are 
excluded. The results are robust to using unscaled forecast 
dispersion. 
 
N_Analysts Number of analysts who have issued an earnings forecast as 
of the 30th day subsequent to prior year's earnings 











Appendix: Variable Definition (Cont.) 
FC_Error Analyst forecast error, computed as the square of the 
difference between the mean analyst forecast and the actual 
value, scaled by the absolute value of actual earnings. The 
measure is computed for forecasts outstanding as of the 30th 
day subsequent to prior year's earnings announcement. 
Forecasts older than 90 days are excluded. The results are 
robust to using unscaled forecast errors. 
 
Value_Relevance R2 from an eight-year rolling regression of stock price three 
months after the fiscal year end on earnings and book value 
of equity. 
 
DD Negative one mutiplies the absolute value of the error term 
from an eight-year rolling regression of total current accruals 
(income before extraordinary items minus operating cash 
flows) on last year's operating cash flow, current year's 
operating cash flow, one-year ahead future cash flow, growth 
in total revenue and growth in property, plant and equitment. 
All variables in the regression are scaled by average total 
assets. 
 
Overall_Uncertainty Analyst overall uncertainty, computed following Barron et al. 
(1998): (1-1/N_Analysts)*Disp+Se, where N_Analysts is the 
number of analysts, Disp is the forecast dispersion (variance 
of the individual analyst forecasts scaled by the absolute 
value of the actual earnings); Se is the square of forecast error 
scaled by the absolute value of actual earnings. The measure 
is computed as of each fiscal quarter and averaged across the 
four quarters each year. Forecasts older than 90 days are 
excluded. 
Inside_Ret Average buy-and-hold size-adjusted open market trading 
returns of inside directors during the fiscal years which the 
outside director has made her purchases. Sales returns are 
multiplied by -1. The specific horizons (3/6/9/12 months) and 
transaction type (purchases/sales) correspond to the 
dependent variables in the regressions. 
 
Restrict  An indicator variable if 75% or more of its insider trading 
occurred within one month after its quarterly earnings 
announcements. 
 





Appendix: Variable Definition (Cont.) 
Frenquency 1 The average number of trades an outside director makes at 
each firm per year, including years in which no trade is made. 
Frenquency 2 The average number of trades an outside director makes at 
each firm per year, including only years in which at least a 
trade is made. 
 
Compen_Committee An indicator variable if the outside director is on the 
compensation committee and zero otherwise. 
Ind_Expert An indicator variable if the outside director has work 
experience at firms in the same Fama-French 48 industry. 
Tie An indicator variable that equals one if the outside director 
has connections with the CEO via prior employment, 
education or other social activities and 0 otherwise. 
 
RND An indicator variable that equals 1 if the ratio of R&D 
expenditure over total assets ranks in the upper quartile in the 
sample and 0 otherwise. 
 
Leverage Long-term debt divided by total assets. 
Intangibles 1 minus the ratio of property, plant and equipment over total 
assets.   
 
(Log_)N_Segments (Log of) total number of business segments. 
Ind_Concentration Herfindahl index of the sales of business segments, i.e., the 
sum of the squares of each segment's sales as a percentage of 
total firm sales. 
 
Geo_Concentration Herfindahl index of the sales of geographic segments, i.e., the 
sum of the squares of each segment's sales as a percentage of 
total firm sales. 
 Size Log of market value of equity. 
 N_People_Purchase/Sale Number of inside and outside directors who have made open 
market purchases/sales during the years which the outside 
director has made her purchases. 
 
ROA Net income before extraordinary items over total assets. 






Appendix: Variable Definition (Cont.) 
Board_Indep Percentage of outside directors on board. 
Institution Percentage of institutional holdings. 
Audit_Committee An indicator variable if the outside director is on the audit 
committee and zero otherwise. 
Nomin_Committee An indicator variable if the outside director is on the 
nomination committee and zero otherwise. 
Cyclicality The average of R2s from regressions over the prior 12 
quarters of a firm’s earnings on GDP, energy prices and 
interest rate spreads, following Hutton, Lee and Shu (2012).  
Litigation An index that includes stock return volatility (the standard 
deviation of daily stock returns over the fiscal year), stock 
return skewness (the skewness of daily stock returns over the 
fiscal year), sales growth (percentage increase in annual 
sales), stock turnover (annualized daily stock turnover, 
computed as (1-(1-average daily stock turnover)^(No. of 
trading days during the year), where average daily stock 
turnover is the average of number of shares traded per day 
divided by number of shares outstanding across the trading 
days during the year) and absolute abnormal returns (absolute 
value of buy-and-hold market-adjusted returns during the 
fiscal year) (Kim and Skinner, 2012). 
Predictability Absolute value of the error term from an eight-year rolling 
regression of one-year ahead future earnings on current 
earnings (both scaled by beginning-of-year total assets).  
Liquid Negative one multiplies the ratio of the absolute value of 
daily stock returns over daily dollar trading volume averaged 
across the year (Amihud, 2002). 
Committee Number of committees the outside director sits on at each 
firm. 
MTB  Market-to-book ratio measured by the log of book value of 
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